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WELL-BEING ANALYSIS VS. COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS
JOHN BRONSTEEN†
CHRISTOPHER BUCCAFUSCO††
JONATHAN S. MASUR†††
ABSTRACT
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is the primary tool used by
policymakers to inform administrative decisionmaking. Yet its
methodology of converting preferences (often hypothetical ones) into
dollar figures, then using those dollar figures as proxies for quality of
life, creates significant systemic errors. These problems have been
lamented by many scholars, and recent calls have gone out from
world leaders and prominent economists to find an alternative
analytical device that would measure quality of life more directly.
This Article proposes well-being analysis (WBA) as that alternative.
Relying on data from studies in the field of hedonic psychology that
track people’s actual experience of life—data that have consistently
been found reliable and valid—WBA is able to provide the same
policy guidance as CBA without CBA’s distortionary reliance upon
predictions and dollar figures. We show how WBA can be
implemented, and we catalog its advantages over CBA. In light of this
comparison, we conclude that WBA should assume CBA’s role as the
decisionmaking tool of choice for administrative regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Virtually every law makes people’s lives better in some ways but
worse in others. For example, a clean-air law could make people
healthier, but it could also force them to pay more money for the
1
products they buy. Every proposed law thus raises the question:
2
Would its benefits outweigh its costs?
To answer that question, there needs to be a way of comparing
seemingly incommensurable things like health and buying power. The
most common method is to ask how much money people are willing
to pay for benefits like improved health (or how much money they
are willing to accept for negatives like increased risks to their health).
Suppose, for example, it could be determined that people are willing
to pay $100 more per year in return for the health benefits of cleaner
air. Those benefits could then be compared, by this first approach, to
increased consumer costs.
This approach is called cost-benefit analysis (CBA), and it has
long been the dominant method of systematic analysis for evaluating
3
government policy. Every economically significant regulation from
1. The reason is that businesses may have to spend more money to produce their products
in a way that avoids polluting. If so, then someone must bear that cost and have less buying
power as a result. It might be consumers (via higher prices), employees (via lower wages or job
cuts), or business owners (via lower profits); but it must be someone.
Economic analysis of the effect of price increases on welfare can be complicated,
because the effect may depend upon how consumers are likely to react to an increase in a
specific context. Whether income effects or substitution effects predominate will vary. For
simplicity, we refer here to reductions in buying power as an example of a potential cost or
negative consequence of regulation, without specifying the complications from possible
substitution effects.
2. This question is typically the first step in analyzing a law, but other steps may follow.
We use the terms “costs” and “benefits” to refer to a law’s effects on people’s quality of life, and
such effects may not be the only consideration in evaluating a law. For example, there may be
moral reasons to support a law even if it would decrease human welfare. Thus, this Article
concerns one step in the decisionmaking process, the step of assessing a law’s effects on the
quality of human life. It is an important step, but not necessarily the only one.
3. Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is an alternative that has been used as well, albeit far
less frequently than CBA, by government agencies in the United States. We discuss CEA in
some detail later in this Article in the context of assessing quality-adjusted life years (QALYs),
which are CEA’s primary measure of outcomes. See infra Part IV.B.2. Other methods of
systematic evaluation, such as multi-attribute analysis, exist as well, though they are even less
commonly used by U.S. government regulators than is CEA.
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executive-branch agencies must, by law, be evaluated via CBA (or in
5
some cases via cost-effectiveness analysis). This has been the case
6
since 1981, when President Reagan mandated it by executive order.
That order has been reaffirmed by every president since, including
7
8
Presidents Clinton and Obama.
Despite CBA’s prominence, however, it has been criticized
9
harshly from the moment it was first required by executive order to
10
11
the present day, and countless times in between. More often than
12
not, the criticisms are scathing. Indeed, even CBA’s most prominent
defenders have written entire books and major articles prompted by
13
their own acknowledgments of CBA’s flaws.

4. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012).
5. Id.; Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
note at 745 (2006); Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations Under Executive Order 12866,
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, (Jan. 11, 1996), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
inforeg_riaguide. Regarding CEA, see supra note 3 and our discussion of QALYs infra Part
IV.B.2.
6. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 431
(1982), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638.
7. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638.
8. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215.
9. See, e.g., Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, REGULATION,
Jan./Feb. 1981, at 33, 33 (“In areas of environmental, safety, and health regulation, there may be
many instances where a certain decision might be right even though its benefits do not outweigh
its costs.”).
10. See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, Rationality or Rationalism?: The Positive and Normative
Flaws of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 79, 82 (2011).
11. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545 (1997); Robert H. Frank, Why Is
Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 913 (2000) (evaluating the various
objections to cost-benefit analysis); Daniel Kahneman & Jack Knetsch, Valuing Public Goods:
The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction, 22 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 57 (1992); Duncan Kennedy,
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); Thomas
O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1998) [hereinafter McGarity, A CostBenefit State]; Thomas O. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing
Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 179–91
(1983); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999); Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s CostBenefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191 (2004).
12. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS 234 (2004) (“Costbenefit analysis of health and environmental policies trivializes the very values that gave rise to
those policies in the first place.”); Kennedy, supra note 11, at 388 (“[T]he program of generating
a complete system of private law rules by application of the criterion of efficiency is
incoherent.”).
13. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006); ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT
(Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997); REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (Winston

BBM IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/15/2013 2:54 PM

WBA vs. CBA

1607

Along these lines, an important if subsidiary contribution of this
Article is to combine our own new criticisms of CBA with those of
others to make the case that CBA suffers from limitations inherent to
14
its methodology. The only method ever used to compare laws’ pluses
and minuses—the method that has been mandated for the past three
decades—is flawed.
Yet it survives. A primary reason for its survival is evident and
voiced often: no comparably rigorous, quantitative, and workable
alternative exists for commensurating a law’s positive and negative
15
consequences. Since virtually any law will both help people and hurt
them, an important element of deciding whether to enact it will
16
typically be to weigh the good against the bad. Asking how much
people are willing to pay for the good—and thereby converting all
consequences into dollar figures—is viewed by many as the best
17
option for rigorously attempting to commensurate the effects.
In this Article, we propose an alternative method for comparing
the positive and negative consequences of a law. This method, which
we label “well-being analysis” (WBA), would analyze directly the
effect of costs and benefits on people’s quality of life. For example,
clean-air laws would be assessed by comparing how much more
people would enjoy their lives if they became healthier with how
much less they would enjoy their lives if their buying power were

Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling & Richard D. Morgenstern eds., 2009); RICHARD L. REVESZ &
MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN
BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A.
Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999); Robert H. Frank & Cass R.
Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323 (2001); Robert W.
Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper
and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition
and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000).
14. See infra Parts III and V. Those Parts also advance our primary objective, which is to
show the superiority of the alternative we propose. In contrasting the two methods, we consider
not only CBA as it is now practiced but also the proposed improvements to it that have been
advanced by CBA’s defenders.
15. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 13; REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 13. One of us
has argued to this effect before. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility
Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 710 (2010).
16. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
17. In ultimate policymaking decisions, CBA is very often combined with non-monetized
qualitative considerations—as authorized by the executive orders themselves. But it is the
monetization that primarily differentiates CBA from mere intuitionistic decision analysis,
because the monetization constitutes an attempt to directly and fully commensurate negative
and positive consequences. This is the foundation of CBA’s appeal, and it is the thing to which
we offer an alternative here.
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reduced. This is the most natural and direct way to put seemingly
incommensurable things on the same scale. And it yields the specific
answer that is needed: whether a law will make people’s actual
experience of life better or worse on the whole.
Until now, this sort of direct assessment has been assumed to be
impossible. But it has been made feasible by the emergence of a new
field within social science known as hedonic psychology. Hedonics is
the study of how people experience their lives, and in particular the
measurement of how much any factor improves or worsens that
experience. Originally, some critics questioned whether hedonic
19
studies could credibly measure the quality of people’s experiences.
But over the past fifteen years, these critics have been quieted by the
success of such studies in producing replicable results that pass social
20
science’s rigorous tests of validity.
Accordingly, there have been widespread calls for the findings of
hedonic psychology to be used to inform government policy. The
United Nations General Assembly recently passed a resolution urging
countries “to pursue the elaboration of additional measures that
better capture the importance of the pursuit of happiness and well21
being . . . with a view to guiding their public policies.” This view has
also been endorsed by Great Britain’s Prime Minister David
22
23
Cameron, France’s then-President Nicolas Sarkozy, three widely
24
divergent winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics, and a recent
18. Again, we refer to “buying power” because it is a simple way to signify the economic
cost. We mean the term to include, not to ignore, the potential complications introduced by
considerations such as the extent to which consumers are able to substitute other goods for
those whose prices will increase. See supra note 1.
19. Daniel Kahneman, Peter Wakker & Rakesh Sarin, Back to Bentham? Explorations of
Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. ECON. 375, 379 (1997) (“The view that hedonic states cannot be
measured because they are private events is widely held . . . .”).
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. G.A. Res. 65/309, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/309 (July 19, 2011). The resolution
contrasted such new measures with “the gross domestic product indicator,” which “was not
designed to and does not adequately reflect the happiness and well-being of people in a
country.” Id.
22. Roger Cohen, Op-Ed., The Happynomics of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at 12.
23. Henry Samuel, Nicolas Sarkozy Wants To Measure Economic Success in ‘Happiness,’
TELEGRAPH
(Sept.
14,
2009,
6:24
PM
BST),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/europe/france/6189530/Nicolas-Sarkozy-wants-to-measure-economic-successin-happiness.html.
24. They are Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Daniel Kahneman. See JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, AMARTYA SEN & JEAN-PAUL FITOUSSI, REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON THE
MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 16 (2009), available at
http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf; Daniel Kahneman & Robert
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25

president of Harvard University. The U.S. government, as well as
several states and localities, has begun exploring the possibility of
26
using hedonic data to formulate policy.
To make this a reality, however, a methodology must be created
for using the data from hedonic psychology to evaluate prospective
27
laws. We create such a methodology in this Article, and we show
how it can be used to analyze the same regulations currently assessed
28
by CBA. We then explain how many of the flaws of CBA, some of
which have long been recognized and others of which we expose here,
29
would be corrected by WBA.
Policymaking and social science are not like mathematics, and
thus any of their tools will have imperfections. WBA is no exception,
as we acknowledge in the ensuing Parts. However, WBA cures many
of the largest problems of CBA. It is capable of immediate

Sugden, Experienced Utility as a Standard of Policy Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON.
161, 178 n.11 (2005).
25. DEREK BOK, THE POLITICS OF HAPPINESS: WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN LEARN FROM
THE NEW RESEARCH ON WELL-BEING 45 (2010). In legal scholarship, Adam Kolber has done
pioneering work in elucidating the value that experiential measures can bring to the law. See,
e.g., Adam Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585, 588 (2011) (“My
central claim is that as new technologies emerge to better reveal people’s experiences, the law
ought to do more to take these experiences into account.”). Kolber has focused more on
neuroscientific measures than on those of hedonic psychology, and more on the civil- and
criminal-justice systems than on administrative rulemaking, but he places the same emphasis on
experiential measurement that we endorse here and throughout our work.
26. OFFICE OF MGMT & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 46 (2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2011_cb/2011_cba_report.pdf (“OMB
continues to investigate the relevant [hedonic] literature and to explore, in a preliminary way, its
possible implications for improving regulatory policy in ways that promote the goals of
economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation.”); Wendy Koch, If Money
Doesn’t Buy Happiness, USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 2012, available at http://usatoday30.
usatoday.com/NEWS/usaedition/2012-08-02-Gross-national-happiness_CV_U.htm
(listing
several cities and states that have begun to consider using hedonic data in governmental
decisionmaking).
27. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as
Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583, 1628–41 (2010); Anthony Vitarelli, Note, Happiness Metrics in
Federal Rulemaking, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 115, 133 (2010) (“Despite the proliferation of these
metrics, a core challenge remains—creating a useful translation between the happiness
measures and traditional measures of economic cost.”). Vitarelli suggests that hedonic metrics
be used to supplement cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 127. Although we take a somewhat more
optimistic view of the hedonic measures and a somewhat more pessimistic view of CBA than he
does, this Article answers his call for a way to use the hedonic metrics to evaluate regulations.
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Parts III–V.
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implementation, and even in its infancy, it may be able to produce
analyses more accurate than the ones CBA now produces after three
30
decades of refinement. We demonstrate this point directly by using
WBA to reengineer an actual CBA that was used to assess a clean31
water regulation.
In Part I, we provide an overview of CBA and its methodology.
In Part II, we explain how WBA would work in practice and the data
upon which it would rely. In doing so, we contrast an actual CBA
with a prototype of a WBA for the same regulation. The following
Parts address the major problems with CBA that undermine its
reliability and validity, and they suggest how WBA solves these
problems. Part III addresses the shortcomings of CBA’s use of stated
and revealed preferences as proxies for well-being, Part IV focuses on
limitations in the way that CBA defines the value of life, and Part V
addresses issues associated with discounting the value of future
money. At each step, we explain the ways in which WBA would
overcome many of CBA’s shortcomings and potentially provide a
more accurate accounting of a prospective policy’s effects on the
quality of life.
I. HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS WORKS, AND ITS
CORE LIMITATION
How do elected officials and regulators decide which policies to
32
enact? They are surely influenced by political considerations, and
they may also have ideological commitments. But at least in some
cases, they simply want to make good policy. And even when politics
or ideology constrains a choice, a range of acceptable options
33
typically remains. Accordingly, regulators and elected officials and
their staffs devote substantial time to identifying which policies are
34
worth undertaking.

30. This is due to the advantages of WBA, discussed throughout this Article, that stem
from its use of a better proxy for welfare than CBA uses. Of course, the accuracy of any given
CBA or WBA will depend in part upon the quality of the methods used, which may vary
according to the available data and other considerations.
31. See infra Part II.C.
32. Examples of such considerations would be pleasing their constituents and campaign
donors, even in cases in which doing so is at odds with the public good.
33. At a minimum, it is useful to know what the best policy would be before deciding how
to weigh that consideration against others.
34. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (1992) (describing the civic republican model as one in which
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Before they even begin, they must define what makes a policy
worthwhile. A metaphysically correct definition of worth, if such a
thing exists, may be beyond humanity’s current grasp. However, there
is widespread agreement that improving the quality of human life is at
least an important component. Because virtually everyone deems it
desirable to make people’s lives better, at least when all else is equal,
35
that has become the primary focus of policy analysis. What it means
to make someone’s life better is, in turn, a potentially difficult
question.
In a previous article, we argued that a person’s quality of life—
or, as it is more commonly labeled in economics, “welfare” or “wellbeing”—is simply the sum of the positive and negative feelings she
36
experiences throughout her lifetime. This view differs from those
held by some economists (who view welfare as preference
satisfaction—that is, getting what one wants) and some philosophers
(who view welfare as the attainment of certain objective qualities or
37
capabilities). Importantly, however, the different conceptions of
38
welfare overlap in practice far more than they diverge. The question,
then, is not what it means to make life better, but rather how to
decide which policy would do so.
A. CBA and Welfare
Understanding whether a regulation does, in fact, improve
quality of life is often difficult. At least theoretically, a new policy
may improve the lives of a group of people without negatively

“government’s primary responsibility is to enable the citizenry to deliberate about altering
preferences and to reach consensus on the common good”).
35. Adler & Posner, supra note 13, at 177.
36. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 27, at 1590–95. We use the terms “welfare”
and “well-being” interchangeably throughout this Article.
37. Id. at 1601–27.
38. Id. at 1588, 1610, 1617. For instance, there is evidence that when selecting among
different plans, people generally choose the option that they believe will make them happiest.
Daniel J. Benjamin et al., What Do You Think Would Make You Happier? What Do You Think
You Would Choose?, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 2083, 2107 (2012). This in turn implies that
preferentist and hedonic views of welfare are closely related. In limited circumstances, one’s
conception of welfare could affect whether one views cost-benefit analysis or well-being analysis
as a better proxy for it. For example, a person might want outcome A, but only because she
mistakenly believes that it will bring her more pleasure than outcome B. An economist who
takes the view that she would be better off getting what she wants, even when her preference is
based on a mistake, may be more likely than others to deem CBA a closer proxy for welfare
than WBA. We think that most people reject this view. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra
note 27, at 1617–18.
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39

impacting anyone. In almost every case, however, the benefits of a
regulation to one group of people will come at the expense of costs
40
borne by either the same or another group of people. Policymakers
thus need a tool that can tell them whether a proposed law or
regulation would improve the overall quality of human life. That is,
would the policy help those who benefit more than it would hurt
41
those who are harmed?
Suppose a regulation would reduce the amount of chemical
pollution emitted into the waterways and thereby reduce the number
of people who die of cancer from the chemical. In so doing, however,
it would increase the cost of manufacturing some good, forcing the
millions of consumers who purchase it to pay more per person for the
good. Whether the benefit of reducing cancer rates is greater than the
cost of increasing the prices that consumers must pay depends, in
part, on the respective effects of health and consumer purchases on
human welfare.
CBA provides a method for comparing such seemingly
incommensurable values. Its solution is to convert all costs and
benefits into a uniform metric, monetary value, by figuring out how
much money people would be willing to pay for the positives that
regulations can give them. Via this method, an agency can monetize
the value of health and compare it to the monetary value of
consuming goods.
42
Imagine that the clean-water regulation would save ten lives per
year, but that it would also drive up manufacturing costs substantially.

39. We know of no such Pareto-optimal regulations.
40. Most theories of CBA do not equate this kind of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency with ultimate
“rightness” because factors other than wealth maximization could affect such rightness. See
Adler & Posner, supra note 13, at 195 (“[W]e conceive of CBA as a decision procedure, not as a
criterion of moral rightness or goodness.”). Still, learning whether a regulation would increase
or decrease quality of life in the aggregate is widely viewed as an important part of assessing its
desirability.
41. Again, increasing overall well-being need not be the only goal of policymaking. It may
be weighed against considerations such as the distribution of well-being, as well as values
independent of human well-being. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 52–61; Bronsteen
Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 27, at 1589–90. Because overall well-being is one important
consideration, however, both CBA and WBA are designed exclusively to measure it.
42. Those who perform CBA often object to characterizing a regulation as “saving lives”
for two reasons. First, a life cannot be saved, but merely prolonged; and second, a regulation
simply reduces the risk to a population of people rather than prolonging the lives of specific,
pre-identified individuals. We do not view either of these points as a reason to avoid the term
“saving lives.”
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Each of the 1 million consumers who purchase the affected good
would have to pay $50 more per year to acquire that product. CBA
asks whether it is worth spending $50 million ($50/person × 1 million
people) to save 10 lives. To answer this question, CBA must place a
price on the lives being saved.
To find out the cost people would be willing to pay for any type
of regulatory benefit, such as avoiding the loss of life from cancer,
43
CBA has two methods available. The first is “revealed preferences”
and the second is “stated preferences,” the latter of which is most
commonly determined by contingent valuation surveys that ask
44
people how much they would be willing to pay for a benefit.
Revealed preferences are available when people have been faced
with an opportunity to choose between some regulatory benefit and
some amount of money in their actual lives, such that CBA can
simply observe which option they chose. Their decision is said to
reveal whether they prefer, for example, having more money or
reducing their risk of death. Identifying that preference enables
regulators to place a value on something like increased water quality,
because it shows how much money people are willing to spend in
order to minimize or eliminate a risk to their life. When they are
available, revealed preferences are typically preferred to stated
preferences, although this is not an absolute: a high-quality stated-

The first point is one that we take very seriously and discuss later in this Article as an
advantage of WBA, because WBA counts heavily the likely number of years by which lives are
prolonged on average by given regulations, whereas the most common form of CBA does not.
See infra Part IV.B.1. Moreover, everyone understands that people do not live forever, yet
“saving lives” is a widely used term. When a firefighter pulls someone out of a burning building,
it is typical and in no way misleading to say that he saved the person’s life rather than that he
merely prolonged it.
As for the second point, we believe that if a regulation will eliminate a death risk of 1in-10,000 to a population of 1,000,000 people, then it is best to characterize that as an estimated
prospective benefit of saving 100 lives. To a significant degree, CBA effectively does this,
regardless of the terminology it chooses. It is true that people are willing to pay more money to
save identified individuals than they are to reduce statistical risks (whose reduction ends up
saving as-yet-unspecified individuals), and the animating principles of CBA dictate that this
matters. But as we explain later in this Article, we consider that a flaw in CBA rather than a
problem with the term “saving lives.”
43. See infra Part III.A.
44. See infra Part III.B. Another stated-preference method is choice experiments. They
have been used far less frequently than contingent valuation surveys, but this may be starting to
change. In any event, choice experiments are vulnerable to many of the same problems we
discuss with contingent valuation surveys, and certainly to the same overarching disadvantages
of CBA vis-à-vis WBA. To wit, they rely on predictions of welfare rather than in-the-moment
measures of welfare.
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preference study may be chosen over a lower-quality revealed
preference study.
When analyzing actual regulations with trade-offs like those of
the clean-water regulation mentioned above, economists performing
45
CBA would typically use the revealed preference method. They
would look for a real-life situation in which people have chosen
between having more money and avoiding a low-probability risk of
death. Such a situation is said to arise when people choose their jobs,
because one thing that differentiates jobs is the degree of mortality
risk that they entail. Being a firefighter, for example, is more
dangerous than being an accountant. CBA’s idea is as follows. First, it
uses statistical analysis to try to identify two jobs that are the same in
every way except two: Job A is riskier than Job B, and to compensate
for that risk, Job A pays more than Job B. People who choose Job A
rather than Job B are said to have willingly accepted a somewhat
higher risk of death (one that is low probability in absolute terms, but
still higher than the risk in other jobs) in return for the benefit of
higher wages. The amount of extra money that they make is the
revealed market value of risk avoidance. If a job with a 1-in-10,000
annual risk of death pays $600 more annually than an otherwise
comparable job with no risk (the hypothetical no-risk job is used here
for simplicity of explication), then the value of avoiding such a risk is
pegged at $600. Accordingly, society would collectively be willing to
46
spend $6 million ($600 multiplied by 10,000) for each life saved.
Indeed, this is close to the actual number that economists employing
47
CBA have produced. A regulation that will save 10 lives is thus
deemed to increase overall well-being if and only if it costs consumers
a collective total of $60 million or less.

45. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and
Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 586 (2004) (“[W]hatever
preferences individuals seem to reveal through their market behavior are taken to be the best
measure of true ‘wants’ or ‘desires’ and, therefore, also are taken exclusively to provide the
valuation inputs that in critical part determine the policy outputs of CBA.”).
46. Avoiding the risk is worth $600, but the regulators know that a certain number of
people are likely to actually die without the regulation. Therefore, they need to know how much
society is willing to pay to save those lives. If avoiding a 1-in-10,000 risk is worth $600, then
avoiding an actual death (that is, a 1-in-1 “risk”) is worth $6 million ($600 × 10,000).
47. E.g., W. Kip Viscusi, How To Value A Life, 32 J. ECON. & FIN. 311, 312–14 (2008); see
also, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 815-R-00-026, ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER
RULE: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 5-28 (2000) (estimating the value of a statistical life at $6.1
million).
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If no revealed preference were available, then CBA would call
for the use of a contingent valuation study. This would entail giving
people surveys that ask how much money they would be willing to
spend in return for avoiding a 1-in-10,000 risk of death. These surveys
have also been used, for example, to learn people’s willingness to pay
48
for things like preserving the lives of endangered species.
B. The Core Advantage of WBA over CBA
CBA is based on this idea: how much money a person is willing
to pay for a thing shows how much the thing increases her welfare.
But that is not true. When someone buys a thing in the hope of
improving her welfare, she has made a prediction—a guess—about
how the thing will affect her. That prediction may well be wrong, and
indeed it usually is. Daniel Gilbert and Timothy Wilson’s pioneering
work has demonstrated that people are not good at predicting how
49
their choices will affect how they feel in the future.
By contrast, people are good at reporting how they feel right
now. In-the-moment self-reports pass the same tests of reliability and
50
validity that are failed by affective predictions. This should not be
surprising; guessing how you will feel in the future is of course more
error-prone than saying how you feel now. And the reasons for this
are apparent: “[The mind’s] simulations are deficient because they
are based on a small number of memories, they omit large numbers of
features, they do not sustain themselves over time, and they lack
context. Compared to sensory perceptions, mental simulations are
51
mere cardboard cut-outs of reality.”
Thus, a decision tool will be better at approximating welfare if it
is based on self-assessments of how people feel in the moment than if
it is based on predictions of how people will feel in the future. This is
the central insight behind well-being analysis and its primary
52
advantage over cost-benefit analysis.
48. E.g., John B. Loomis & Douglas S. White, Economic Benefits of Rare and Endangered
Species: Summary and Meta-Analysis, 18 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 197, 203 (1996).
49. See, e.g., Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future,
317 SCI. 1351, 1354 (2007); Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting:
Knowing What To Want, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 131, 131 (2005).
50. See infra Part II.B.
51. Gilbert & Wilson, supra note 49, at 1354 (emphasis added).
52. Even if feeling good is not identical to welfare, few would deny that it is at minimum a
major part of welfare. Indeed, when CBA’s proponents delineate which preferences count
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II. WELL-BEING ANALYSIS
Defenders of CBA have long argued that, despite its flaws, costbenefit analysis is the best available means for determining the
53
welfare effects of a project or regulation. That may no longer be the
case. We propose here an alternative method for analyzing regulatory
policy: well-being analysis (WBA). WBA shares the basic framework
of CBA, that of comparing costs and benefits, but it differs in the data
and analytical tools it employs to make such comparisons.
Instead of monetizing the effects of regulation, WBA
“hedonizes” them. That is, it measures how much a regulation raises
or lowers people’s enjoyment of life. For example, if a regulation
would result in improved health but higher prices of products, then
WBA would compare how much more people enjoy their lives when
they are made healthier with how much less they enjoy their lives
when their buying power decreases.
Like CBA, WBA is a tool for analyzing the welfare effects of
policies—not a panacea meant to be the last word on what should be
done. Policy analysis often proceeds by analyzing welfare effects and
then weighing those effects against whatever other considerations are
deemed relevant by regulators, legislators, and the citizenry they
54
55
serve, including fairness, justice, and human dignity. Our
contribution is to try to improve upon the first step of the process, the
step in which welfare effects are measured. This would influence
policy, but it in no way implies that we think the first step is the only
step. Like proponents of CBA, we acknowledge the role that other
56
considerations may play.

toward welfare, the result ends up looking remarkably like those preferences that result in
feeling good. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 27, at 1622–27.
Moreover, even informed and accurate preferences are likely to be further removed
from welfare than is happiness because many of those preferences are not self-interested. When
someone expresses a preference by her willingness to pay for something, that preference is not
necessarily aimed at increasing her own welfare (and thus should be excluded by CBA, which is
a tool for welfare assessment).
53. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 13.
54. See Adler & Posner, supra note 13, at 245 (“CBA does not capture, and is not meant to
capture, nonwelfarist considerations.”).
55. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012).
56. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 53 (noting the possible roles of “moral rights,
the fair distribution of welfare, and even moral considerations wholly detached from welfare,
such as intrinsic environmental values” that could be considered alongside the value of
aggregate welfare when making public policy).
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Subsequent Parts of this Article argue that WBA solves many of
the conceptual and methodological problems facing CBA. This Part
introduces WBA and explains the sources, validity, and reliability of
its data.
A. WBA: The Basic Framework
WBA directly analyzes the effects of regulations on people’s
quality of life. To do that, it relies on hedonic-psychology data that
measure how different factors affect people’s enjoyment of their lives.
In theory, such measures could perhaps be purely neurological—
taken by a machine that reports how good someone feels at all times.
But unless and until that sort of technology is created, psychologists
must rely instead on individuals’ personal assessments of how their
lives are going for them at a particular moment in time. Fortunately,
these self-assessments can be taken in ways that yield highly reliable
results, as we explain in detail in the following Section.
Individuals’ self-assessments indicate their level of subjective
well-being (SWB), or “happiness.” Recently, psychologists and
economists have developed increasingly sophisticated surveying and
statistical methods that enable the collection and analysis of well57
being data on a large scale. WBA uses these data to evaluate the
welfare consequences of regulations by comparing the well-being
gains and losses of affected parties. This Section explains the
conceptual framework behind WBA, whereas the following Section
discusses the data upon which WBA relies. The final Section of Part
II explains how the data would be used in the actual performance of
WBA.
WBA relies on the same basic cost-benefit-weighing principle
that undergirds CBA: all else equal, regulations whose benefits
exceed their costs are valuable because they enhance overall welfare.
The main difference between the two techniques involves the way in
which costs and benefits are calculated and compared. Regulations
involve both market and nonmarket costs and benefits. For CBA,
market effects are relatively easy to handle, because computing their
monetary value is straightforward. Nonmarket effects, however, are
more difficult for CBA. As we will describe in greater detail, CBA
must apply a variety of problematic tools to monetize the value of
57. Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz, Preface to WELL-BEING: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, at ix, xii (Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert
Schwarz eds., 1999).
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health, lives, and the environment. WBA avoids many of these
difficulties by looking directly to a regulation’s effects on people’s
experiences and lives. In WBA, all effects of a regulation are
hedonized, which is to say that they are converted into units directly
measuring their impact on the subjective well-being of the affected
parties. The positive and negative hedonic impacts can then be
compared with one another. They are the relevant costs and benefits.
Instead of converting regulatory effects into monetary values,
WBA converts them into well-being units (WBUs). WBUs are
intended to be subjective, hedonic, cardinal, and interpersonally
comparable units that indicate the degree of a person’s happiness for
a given period of time. They are, in some respects, similar to the
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) that are increasingly popular in
58
health economics.
WBA maps a person’s SWB onto a scale that would ideally run
from -10 to 10, in which 10 indicates perfect happiness (subjectively
defined), -10 indicates perfect misery, and 0 indicates neutrality or the
absence of experience. This type of scale would allow individuals to
register experiences that are worse than nonexperience (undergoing a
root canal, for instance) and would simplify the comparison between
experience and nonexperience. Most of the well-being data that have
59
been collected to date have employed a scale from 0 to 10.
Accordingly, in the WBA that we conduct below, we utilize a scale
running from 0 to 10. As the science of WBA evolves, we would
60
envision transitioning to the preferred -10 to 10 scale.
Each decile of the scale is equivalent and indicates a 10 percent
61
change in the person’s SWB. Moreover, we treat the scale as
identical across individuals, although, of course, the kinds of things
62
that affect different individuals’ SWB may not be. One WBU is
equivalent to 1.0 on the scale for a period of one year. Thus, if a
person lives to the age of 100 and has an SWB of 7.0 for each year,

58. In Part IV we describe the differences between QALYs and WBUs and the advantages
of the latter.
59. See Richard R. Layard, G. Mayraz & S. Nickell, The Marginal Utility of Income, 92 J.
PUB. ECON. 1846, 1848 tbl.1 (2008) (collecting examples of well-being studies). Scales from 0 to
7 are also common.
60. Converting from one scale to another is also possible by using studies that pose the
same questions to the same (or comparable) individuals on different scales.
61. This requires that the scale be intrapersonally cardinal.
62. This requires that the scale be interpersonally cardinal. We discuss the issues raised by
this cardinality requirement in greater detail in Part II.B.4.
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that person has experienced 700 WBUs (7.0 WBU/year × 100 years).
If an event such as illness causes a person’s SWB to drop from 7.0 to
5.5 for a period of ten years, that person loses 15 WBUs (1.5
WBU/year × 10 years) over her lifetime.
This type of scale has significant benefits for any type of decision
analysis, particularly regulatory analysis, because it enables the direct
comparison of the hedonic impact of proposed policy changes.
Imagine, for example, that the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) is contemplating a simple regulation of
workplace safety that will prevent 100 workers from each losing an
arm while on the job. Implementing such a measure, however, will
increase the costs of production and force factories to fire 300
workers in the affected industry.
CBA would attempt to calculate the value of the regulation by
monetizing the costs and benefits it generates. With respect to the
costs, CBA would in theory be able to estimate the lost wages of the
63
300 unemployed people. The benefits, however, are trickier.
Establishing a market price for the value of an arm is a fraught
64
enterprise. Given these shortcomings, the value CBA applies to the
loss of an arm will be beset by a number of systematic errors
associated with wealth effects, labor-market effects, and people’s
poor ability to predict how events like losing an arm will affect them.
Accordingly, CBA may substantially and systematically misstate the
benefits of the regulation.
WBA would approach the measure in the same general fashion
but with different analytical data. Like CBA, WBA would attempt to
quantify the cost of unemployment. But instead of looking solely to
the workers’ lost wages, it would calculate the hedonic cost of being
65
unemployed. Some data suggest that unemployment has a significant
66
effect on well-being. Thus, the welfare costs of unemployment may
be much greater than CBA predicts. On the other side of the ledger,

63. In practice, however, CBA typically ignores the costs associated with unemployment.
See infra Part II.C.
64. We discuss the many possible shortcomings of CBA’s attempts to do so in Part III.
65. CBA could, in theory, use contingent valuation studies to estimate in monetary terms
these hedonic consequences, but this does not currently happen as a matter of standard practice.
In addition, such studies would suffer from the same kinds of problems, notably affective
forecasting errors, that affect contingent valuation generally.
66. See Richard E. Lucas, Andrew E. Clark, Yannis Georgellis & Ed Diener,
Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 8, 12 (2004); infra
Part II.C.
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WBA is well positioned to hedonize the benefits of the regulation.
Studies of people who have lost limbs provide fairly accurate
information on the hedonic loss associated with losing an arm (and
67
thus the benefits of avoiding these losses). Again, the results are
likely to be different from those determined by CBA. Studies show
that individuals who lose limbs often adapt substantially to their new
68
condition, recovering most of their lost happiness within a few years.
This result is contrary to the predictions of healthy people, who
typically assume that such disabilities will be devastating and discount
69
the possibility that they will adapt to the loss. Accordingly, the
welfare benefits of the regulation may be overstated by CBA if
contingent valuation or revealed preference surveys rely on
70
mispredictions about hedonic adaptation.
Although this example suggests that the hypothetical OSHA
regulation may be less valuable than CBA implies, in many other
circumstances WBA will point in the direction of more stringent
regulation than CBA would suggest. For many regulations, the chief
benefits will involve extending human lives, and the major costs will
come in the form of higher consumer prices. In the context of WBA,
loss of life constitutes an enormous hedonic cost, whereas many
studies indicate that money has a relatively small effect on well71
being. When money is traded off against life, therefore, WBA is
likely to favor health and safety regulations more than does CBA.
B. The Data of WBA
Social scientists have been attracted to the idea of measuring
human welfare directly for a long time, but they have had difficulty

67. For an excellent summary of the initial research on hedonic adaptation, see Shane
Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS
OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 57, at 302, 311–18.
68. Id. at 312.
69. Peter A. Ubel, George Loewenstein & Christopher Jepson, Disability and Sunshine:
Can Hedonic Predictions Be Improved by Drawing Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emotional
Adaptation?, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 111, 111 (2005) (“One of the most
commonly replicated ‘happiness gaps’ is that observed between the self-rated quality of life of
people with health conditions and healthy people’s estimates of what their quality of life would
be if they had those conditions . . . .” (citation omitted)); Peter A. Ubel et al., Do Nonpatients
Underestimate the Quality of Life Associated with Chronic Health Conditions Because of a
Focusing Illusion?, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 190, 197 (2001).
70. See infra Part III.
71. Daniel Kahneman & Angus Deaton, High Income Improves Evaluation of Life but Not
Emotional Well-Being, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16,489, 16,492 (2010).
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72

securing valid and reliable data. WBA is now feasible because of the
availability of relevant data about the effects of different
circumstances on individual well-being. Over the last decade or so,
new social science techniques have emerged that enable researchers
to study subjective well-being from a variety of different perspectives
73
with a number of different tools. These techniques allow for a more
or less direct measurement of people’s happiness levels, overcoming
the problem that had initially driven economists to seek monetary
74
proxies for welfare. Importantly, they enable the measurement of
what Daniel Kahneman has termed “experienced utility” (how good
people feel), in contrast to the “decision utility” that is typically
75
studied in CBA. Decision utility measures only whether people get
what they want, on the assumption that getting it will make them
better off. But because that assumption has been shown to be deeply
76
imperfect, Kahneman and others have turned toward measuring
directly the quality of people’s experience of life. This Section will
briefly discuss a few of the most promising techniques for collecting
such experiential data and their relative strengths and weaknesses.
1. Life Satisfaction Surveys. The oldest method of measuring
SWB is the life satisfaction survey. These types of surveys ask
individuals to respond to a question such as, “All things considered,
77
how satisfied with your life are you these days?” Respondents
answer on a scale that ranges from “not very happy” to “very happy.”
Life satisfaction surveys have been included in the U.S. General
Social Survey since the 1970s; as a result, we now have substantial
78
quantities of longitudinal data on thousands of individuals. The
principal value in such surveys is the ability to correlate SWB data
with a variety of other facts about people’s lives. Using multivariate
regression analyses that control for different circumstances,
72. E.g., David Colander, Retrospectives: Edgeworth’s Hedonimeter and the Quest To
Measure Utility, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2007, at 215, 215–16.
73. For a review of well-being measures, see ED DIENER, RICHARD LUCAS, ULRICH
SCHIMMACK & JOHN HELLIWELL, WELL-BEING FOR PUBLIC POLICY 46–66 (2009).
74. See id. at 10–11.
75. Kahneman et al., supra note 19, at 375.
76. See infra Part III.A.3.
77. See William Pavot & Ed Diener, Review of the Satisfaction with Life Scale, 5 PSYCHOL.
ASSESSMENT 164, 164 (1993) (discussing the strength of the Satisfaction with Life Scale and
referring to the fact that it is a “judgmental process, in which individuals assess the quality of
their lives on the basis of a unique set of criteria”).
78. DIENER ET AL., supra note 73 Well-Being for Public Policy at 191.
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researchers are able to estimate the strength of the correlations
between SWB and factors such as income, divorce, unemployment,
79
disability, and the death of family members. For example, on
average, the death of a father will yield the loss of 0.25 life satisfaction
points on a scale of 1 to 7 for a period of time, whereas the loss of a
80
spouse will typically yield the loss of 0.89 points.
Life satisfaction surveys are relatively inexpensive to administer
and can be easily included in a variety of larger survey instruments.
Accordingly, they are most valuable as sources of large-scale data
about many subjects and of longitudinal data about changes in SWB
over time. The latter use is especially valuable in assessing the causal
effects of life events (such as marriage, disability, or unemployment)
on SWB, because the same individual can be surveyed both before
and after the event. This eliminates the need for between-subjects
81
comparisons. Life satisfaction surveys are less helpful, however, for
assessing particularly granular changes in circumstances. More
importantly, they rely on global judgments about how people’s lives
are going, rather than on those individuals’ moment-by-moment
hedonic experiences. Because hedonic experiences are often poorly
remembered, such judgments can be biased because of a person’s
82
momentary mood or the order in which questions are posed, among
83
other errors.
2. Experience Sampling Methods.
Researchers sought to
overcome the limitations of life satisfaction surveys by developing
79. See, e.g., Andrew E. Clark, Ed Diener, Yannis Georgellis & Richard E. Lucas, Lags
and Leads in Life Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline Hypothesis, 118 ECON. J. F222, F231
(2008); Richard E. Lucas, Yannis Georgellis, Andrew E. Clark & Ed Diener, Reexamining
Adaptation and the Set Point Model of Happiness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 527, 528 (2003); Richard E. Lucas, Time Does Not Heal All
Wounds: A Longitudinal Study of Reaction and Adaptation to Divorce, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 945,
947–48 (2005).
80. Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Death, Happiness, and the Calculation of
Compensatory Damages, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S217, S232 (2008).
81. See Lucas et al., supra note 79, at 546. Between-subjects comparisons can be a problem
if the two groups (for example, married people and single people) differ about more than just
the comparison issue. Married people are not simply happier because they are married; the
people who get married are more likely to have been happy people in the first place than the
people who are single. Id.
82. See Alan B. Krueger, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur
A. Stone, National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life, in MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE
WELL-BEING OF NATIONS: NATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF TIME USE AND WELL-BEING 9, 29 (Alan
B. Krueger ed., 2009).
83. See id. at 40.
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techniques that enabled them to more directly measure people’s
emotions while they were being experienced. The gold standard of
such measures is the experience sampling method (ESM), which uses
handheld computers and iPhones to survey people about their
84
experiences. Subjects are beeped randomly throughout the day and
asked to record what they are doing and how they feel about it. The
data that emerge from these studies provide a much more detailed
picture of how people spend their time and how their experiences
85
affect them.
Despite their considerable value, ESM studies can be expensive
86
to run. This is why researchers have sought other methods that
produce most of the advantages of ESM but at a lower price. One
such technique is the day reconstruction method (DRM) pioneered
by Daniel Kahneman and his colleagues. The DRM uses daily diary
entries about each day’s experiences to reconstruct an account of
subjects’ emotional lives. DRM studies correlate strongly with ESM
87
studies and can be run at lower cost. Similarly, the Princeton Affect
and Time Survey (PATS) asks subjects to report and evaluate their
88
experiences from the previous day. It can be distributed via
telephone and incorporated into other survey devices, enabling it to
89
reach a larger population.
3. The Quality of Well-Being Data. The ability to generate data is
not the same as the ability to actually measure the thing that one
seeks to measure. Nor is it the ability to measure it well. Data are
only useful if they are reliable and valid. Much of the remainder of
this Article analyzes the reliability and validity of the valuation
measures used by CBA. As a means of comparison, we now discuss
the quality of the data upon which WBA will rely.
Reliability is an indication of the consistency of a measurement
90
instrument. For example, a scale that reported very similar numbers

84. Id. at 30.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., id. (“So far, however, real-time data collection has proved prohibitively
expensive and burdensome to administer to large, representative samples.”).
87. See Daniel Kahneman, Alan B. Krueger, David A. Schkade, Norbert Schwarz &
Arthur A. Stone, A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day
Reconstruction Method, 306 SCI. 1776, 1776 (2004).
88. Krueger et al., supra note 83, at 34–36.
89. Id. at 36.
90. DIENER ET AL., supra note 73, at 68.
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every time the same weight was placed on it would be judged highly
reliable. In the context of well-being measures, reliability can be
assessed by examining correlations between tests and retests of the
same question at separate times, as well as correlations between
91
different questions that ask about similar concepts. Meta-analyses of
different well-being tools have found high levels of reliability for both
92
life satisfaction and experience sampling methods. This is especially
93
true of more advanced multi-item measures.
Just because a measure reliably provides consistent data does not
94
mean that it is measuring what you want it to measure. The ability to
95
actually measure the thing sought to be measured is called validity.
Although a full review of the validity of well-being measures is
96
unnecessary here, it is worth noting a number of findings that
support the conclusion that a person’s well-being can be validly
measured by the tools discussed in the previous Subsection. First,
despite the rather different techniques used to collect data, the
97
various measures of well-being tend to correlate with one another.
One’s overall life satisfaction is correlated both with the amount of
98
positive and negative affect that one feels and with one’s satisfaction
99
with the domains of one’s life. Not only are subjective reports of
well-being correlated with one another, they are also correlated with
100
external measures, such as third-party informant reports, facial
91. Id. at 71.
92. Id. at 72–73. Test-retest reliability results typically range from r = 0.55 to r = 0.70. Id. at
72. These are fairly high numbers, especially given the difficulty of using test-retest calculations
on a measure of well-being that is likely to change significantly over time.
93. Id. at 74.
94. For example, a bathroom scale may provide highly reliable data—the same readout
every time—but those data are probably not a very good measure of your well-being.
95. See Samuel Messick, Validity of Psychological Assessment: Validation of Inferences
from Persons’ Responses and Performances as Scientific Inquiry into Score Meaning, 50 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 741, 741 (1995) (“Validity is an overall evaluative judgment of the degree to
which empirical evidence and theoretical rationales support the adequacy and appropriateness
of interpretations and actions on the basis of test scores or other modes of assessment.” (citation
omitted)).
96. For such a review, see DIENER ET AL., supra note 73, at 74–93.
97. Id. at 70.
98. Michael Eid & Ed Diener, Global Judgments of Subjective Well-Being: Situational
Variability and Long-Term Stability, 65 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 245, 245–46 (2004).
99. Ulrich Schimmack, The Structure of Subjective Well-Being, in THE SCIENCE OF
SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING 97, 97 (Michael Eid & Randy J. Larsen eds., 2007).
100. See Heidi Lepper, Use of Other-Reports To Validate Subjective Well-Being Measures, 44
SOC. INDICATORS RES. 367, 367 (1998) (“Objective reports allow researchers to evaluate
whether the level of SWB reported by the individual is an enduring state and/or observable to
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102

expressions, and neurological data. Well-being measures also tend
103
to be fairly stable over time and exhibit high test-retest reliability.
104
But despite their overall stability, they are also sensitive to changes
in life circumstances: people who experience apparently negative
events do indeed report lower levels of well-being—at least for a
105
time, before they adapt. Moreover, well-being scales can detect the
relative magnitude of life events. For example, people who are more
seriously injured predictably report lower happiness ratings than do
106
people who are less seriously injured. This suggests both that people
are capable of consistently reporting how experiences make them feel
and that their emotional responses generally exhibit credible and
predictable patterns following specific events.
Just as CBA alternately relies upon revealed preference and
contingent valuation studies, WBA would draw upon each of the data
sources mentioned in the preceding Section. In some cases,
longitudinal studies of overall well-being may provide the best data
available for tracking people after events with potentially long-term
107
effects. These studies have been used, for example, by researchers
to understand the hedonic impact of no-fault divorce laws on women

others.”); Ed Sandvik, Ed Diener & Larry Seidlitz, Subjective Well-Being: The Convergence and
Stability of Self-Report and Non-Self-Report Measures, 61 J. PERSONALITY 317, 322 (1993)
(“The reports of informants are likely to summarize emotional information expressed by
subjects over time . . . .”).
101. Tiffany A. Ito & John T. Cacioppo, The Psychophysiology of Utility Appraisals, in
WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 57, at 470, 479.
102. Timothy G. Dinan, Glucocorticoids and the Genesis of Depressive Illness: A
Psychobiological Model, 164 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 365 (1994); Ito & Cacioppo, supra note 101.
103. See Ed Diener & Richard E. Lucas, Personality and Subjective Well-Being, in WELLBEING, supra note 57, at 213, 213–14 (“[I]n spite of . . . transitory influences, SWB is moderately
stable across situations and across the life span . . . .” (citations omitted)).
104. See Sandvik et al., supra note 100, at 338–39 (“The present study clearly indicates that
there are long-term consistencies in average mood . . . .”).
105. See Lucas et al., supra note 66, at 11.
106. See Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A
Longitudinal Study of Disability with Implications for Economists and Judges, 92 J. PUB. ECON.
1061, 1066 (2008). This sensitivity to degree is in contrast to findings that people’s responses to
contingent valuation surveys used in CBA display considerable scope neglect, that is, they are
willing to pay the same amount of money to save 2000, 20,000, or 200,000 endangered birds.
William H. Desvousges, F. Reed Johnson, Richard W. Dunford, Sara P. Hudson & K. Nicole
Wilson, Measuring Natural Resources with Contingent Valuation: Tests of Validity and
Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 91, 113 (Jerry A. Hausman
ed., 1993).
107. This would be the case if no comparable ESM or DRM studies had yet been done for
the relevant conditions.
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108

in different states. In other circumstances, the availability of ESM
studies will enable more fine-grained analyses of regulations’ effects
on people’s lives.
4. Criticisms of Well-Being Data.
Economists and other
defenders of CBA have raised a number of objections to well-being
data, and before we proceed further it is worth addressing those
objections. The first, and most important, is that well-being data lack
interpersonal cardinality because different individuals may interpret
109
the scales differently. For example, a 5.0 on one person’s scale may
not be the same as a 5.0 on another person’s scale. If people interpret
the hedonic scales differently, it becomes impossible to know whether
one person’s reported change from an SWB of 5.0 to 6.0 was
equivalent to another person’s reported change from 5.0 to 6.0.
Although some limited evidence for concern about cardinality
exists in certain contexts, methodological solutions to this problem
are almost certainly available. First, differential use of the scale will
only be a problem when that differential use is related to the
populations being compared. For instance, imagine an agency using
WBA to evaluate a project that will reduce traffic and commuting
times on a highway. To determine the hedonic cost of commuting in
traffic, the agency would compare the well-being of people while they
are commuting with the well-being of people who are not commuting.
Unless people who commute in traffic systematically use the hedonic
scale differently from people who do not, different uses of the scale
will simply show up as random noise. Variations among individuals in
how they rate their own happiness—what they mean when they rate
themselves a 5 or a 6, for instance—are likely to be random, not
110
biased. This randomness should wash out across large numbers of
108. See generally Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
Divorce Laws and Family Distress, 121 Q.J. ECON. 267 (2006).
109. See Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis,
37 J. LEGAL STUD. S253, S280–81 (“The question is whether the numerical scales used in SWB
surveys correspond to a true, interpersonally comparable scale of happiness.”). In fact, concerns
about the interpersonal cardinality of utility pushed economists toward monetization in the first
place. See William Nordhaus, Measuring Real Income with Leisure and Household Production,
in MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF NATIONS: NATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF TIME
USE AND WELL-BEING, supra note 83, at 125, 136.
110. There is some reason to believe that citizens of different nations with vastly different
cultures will treat happiness surveys systematically differently. See Ed Diener & Eunkook M.
Suh, Measuring Subjective Well-Being To Compare Quality of Life of Cultures, in CULTURE
AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING 1, 3 (Ed Diener & Eunkook M. Suh eds., 2000) (“If societies
have different sets of values, people in them are likely to consider different criteria relevant
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111

people. In many of the situations most relevant to WBA, this is
112
virtually certain to be the case.
Cost-benefit analysis is equally subject to concerns about
cardinality. Because of the diminishing marginal value of money, two
individuals with differing levels of personal wealth can obtain vastly
113
different amounts of welfare from the same gain (or loss) of income.

when judging the success of their society.”). Empirical studies have found, however, that
similarly situated individuals in different countries have similar levels of life satisfaction. Betsey
Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Economic Growth and Happiness: Reassessing the Easterlin
Paradox, BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2008, at 1, 67, 69. This suggests that
subjective well-being measures may even be comparable across countries. If that is the case,
they will very likely be comparable across regions or communities within a given country.
111. See Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, Some Uses of Happiness Data in
Economics, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2006, at 25, 29–32 (discussing the possibility of reducing
systemic differential reporting biases by comparing across larger groups). In addition, the UIndex proposed by Krueger et al. is designed to mitigate differences in scale usage. See Krueger
et al., supra note 83, at 18–20.
112. For example, whereas different uses of the scale might be an issue when comparing
surveys conducted in different countries with different languages, it is far less likely to be an
issue when making local or national regulatory policy. There is no evidence that different
populations within the United States use the scale differently. After all, why would individuals
who drive to work in traffic use a hedonic scale differently than the individuals who might be
asked to pay for public-transit projects? Among other things, in many cases these will be the
same populations of people.
Some might contend that circumstances such as disability and unemployment create the
potential for some degree of scale re-norming. That is, they might argue that ideal happiness
could mean something different to a person after becoming seriously disabled or unemployed,
and that the person might report a higher score for the same level of positive feeling than she
would have reported before she was injured or unemployed. There is no reason to believe this is
true, but even if it were, techniques like the U-index developed by Alan Krueger, Daniel
Kahneman, and colleagues avoid the issue of different scale usage by comparing responses only
within subjects. See Krueger et al., supra note 83, at 20. The hedonic data are interpreted with
respect to individuals and converted into externally comparable numbers. Although this
approach does not encompass all relevant data, it nonetheless constitutes an interpersonally
cardinal scale.
In addition, if scale re-norming were taking place, we would expect to see evidence of
adaptation to all debilitating health conditions. All affected individuals would be altering the
way that they report their happiness to take into account their changed circumstances. Yet this
is not what hedonic psychologists have found. Instead, humans appear to exhibit almost
complete adaptation to some conditions, partial adaptation to others, and zero adaptation to
others still, including health problems like chronic pain and ringing in the ears. See John
Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and the
Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1541 (2008). This is a strong indication
that scale renorming is not taking place.
113. See, e.g., Ed Diener & Carol Diener, The Wealth of Nations Revisited: Income and
Quality of Life, 36 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 275, 279–81 (1995) (“[F]or lower levels of income,
there is a rapid rise in meeting physical needs as income increases, but for much of the income
distribution there is a ceiling effect . . . .”); Robert H. Frank, The Frame of Reference as a Public
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Adjusting CBA in accordance with variations in marginal values of
money is quite technically complex, and the proper solution is
114
frequently unclear or highly context dependent. And the problems
for CBA do not end there. Even two equivalently wealthy individuals
may have vastly divergent welfare functions—additional wealth might
benefit one far more than the other. Individuals’ welfare functions are
115
unobservable; economists know (or assume) that marginal values of
money are positive and diminish with increasing wealth, but they can
116
be sure of little else. Economists typically respond to this problem
117
by simply ignoring it or by assuming that its effects dissipate across
118
large populations —in precisely the same way that it will for WBA.
It is thus hard to imagine that interpersonal comparisons will present
greater difficulty for WBA than they do for classical CBA.
A second possible obstacle for WBA lies in the ambiguities
involved in aggregating interpersonal welfare states. For instance, if
Person A’s welfare decreases from 6.0 to 5.0 and the welfare of
Persons B through Z increases from 6.0 to 6.1, it is difficult to know
119
whether this net gain of 1.5 WBUs actually indicates that overall
120
welfare has increased, decreased, or remained constant.
This objection has two components. The first is simply a
repetition of the interpersonal comparison problem discussed above:
it is impossible to know whether a hedonic improvement for Person B
from 6.0 to 6.1 is of equivalent magnitude to a hedonic regression for
Person A from 6.0 to 5.9. We have already addressed this question.
The second component is the argument that, when a project leaves

Good, 107 ECON. J. 1832, 1834–35 (1997) (discussing variation in the significance of income’s
role in satisfaction across income levels).
114. See JAMES C. MCDAVID & LAURA R. L. HAWTHORN, PROGRAM EVALUATION &
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO PRACTICE 265–66 (2006); see also
ADLER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 142–46; Adler & Posner, supra note 13, at 177–81
(illustrating the difficulty of forward-looking CBA under income effects).
115. See PER-OLOV JOHANSSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN WELFARE ECONOMICS
40 (1991); ROBERT L. NADEAU, THE WEALTH OF NATURE 115–16 (2003).
116. Uncertainty concerning individual welfare functions is especially problematic when
attempting to make interpersonal comparisons of utility, which are likely possible in only
limited circumstances. See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 315–19 (1955).
117. See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 13, at 193.
118. See, e.g., id. at 181–87; Di Tella & MacCulloch, supra note 111, at 29.
119. Twenty-five people have each gained 0.1, for a total gain of 2.5, and 1 person has lost
1.0, for a net of 1.5.
120. See Adler & Posner, supra note 109, at S281.
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some people better off and others worse off, a weak welfarist
cannot conclude that it is worth pursuing merely because overall
welfare has increased. This claim is certainly correct, but it is again
identical to the problems faced by CBA or any other wealth-based
decision procedure. The simple fact that a project will result in Person
A receiving $100 and Person B losing $50 is not sufficient reason to
undertake the project in light of distributional issues and other
122
considerations beyond aggregate welfare. This is merely another
way of stating that there is no independent moral or normative
123
significance to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. The fact that Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency is not morally decisive is by now a well-accepted conclusion
124
among even CBA’s most sophisticated defenders.
The final important objection to WBA focuses on hedonic
compensations for prior events—when someone is compensated
during Period 2 for a decrease in welfare that occurred during Period
1. Imagine that an individual has been injured in a car accident,
causing her average moment-by-moment well-being to fall from 6.0 to
125
5.0 for a period of one year (after which time it returns to 6.0).
Imagine that there were two potential methods of compensating her
for her injury: Plan A would raise her well-being from 6.0 to 7.0 for
one year, and Plan B would raise her well-being from 6.0 to 6.5 for
two years. A critic might argue that it is unclear whether either of

121. As we discussed in Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 27, we are weak
welfarists in the following sense: we contend that increasing aggregate welfare is desirable all
else being equal, but we make no claims regarding the relative value of welfare vis-á-vis other
possible values such as the distribution of welfare or welfare-unrelated moral concerns.
122. This is true if Person A and Person B have different welfare functions, such that the
project might diminish overall welfare—again, the problem we address in Part IV.B.2—but it is
also true even if they have identical welfare functions and aggregate welfare will increase.
123. A Kaldor-Hicks efficient outcome is one in which the parties that benefit from a
project “could fully compensate those who stand to lose from it and still be better off.” Amy
Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90
IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1415 (2005). Or, put another way, a project is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if it
would be possible to make a transfer of wealth that would leave all parties better off than before
the project was implemented. ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN, DAVID H. GREENBERG, AIDAN R.
VINING & DAVID L. WEIMER, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 32 (1996).
124. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 22 (“Because Kaldor-Hicks is, taken as a
moral principle, unsound, CBA cannot be justified by reference to Kaldor-Hicks.”); Adler &
Posner, supra note 13, at 195. But see Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 491–97 (1980)
(attempting to justify Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a moral criterion); Richard A. Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 103 (1979) (same).
125. As with the preceding Subsections, we draw this hypothetical (and this objection) from
Adler & Posner, supra note 109, at S281.

BBM IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1630

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/15/2013 2:54 PM

[Vol. 62:1603

these plans would compensate her appropriately. Depending on the
relationship between her survey responses and her actual well-being,
and on how she values the well-being of each of her various temporal
selves, either Plan A or Plan B might over- or undercompensate her.
Upon examination it becomes evident that this objection again
reduces to a combination of two arguments, one of which we have
already addressed. The issue of whether a decline from 6.0 to 5.0 is of
equivalent magnitude to an improvement from 6.0 to 7.0 (or twice
that of an improvement from 6.0 to 6.5) is merely an intrapersonal
variant on the quandary regarding interpersonal comparisons and the
126
shape of hedonic curves. We have already dealt with this question
and shown that it is, if anything, more easily handled than the parallel
problems surrounding CBA. On the other hand, the intertemporal
problem—whether a gain in Period 2 effectively counterbalances a
loss in Period 1—is simply an intrapersonal variant of a broader
question of interpersonal aggregation. That is, if a project increases
overall welfare, is that a sufficient condition for it to be worth
pursuing, even if it decreases the welfare for some individuals? This is
a difficult moral question, and one that we do not attempt to answer
here. There may be many instances in which a project is welfare
increasing but, for distributional reasons, should not be undertaken.
Well-being analysis is not meant as an answer to distributional
concerns, though of course it could be used to provide information
relevant to those concerns.
To facilitate the comparison with cost-benefit analysis, we will
proceed here as if the primary governmental objective were to
127
increase aggregate well-being. This parallels the principal goal
underlying cost-benefit analysis. Accordingly, in the Sections that
follow we describe a regulation or project as “well-being justified” or
“welfare justified” if it would increase the overall aggregate welfare
of the population.
5. Deliberate Manipulation of Well-Being Data. Technical and
theoretical problems with well-being data aside, it is also possible that
individuals or groups would seek to manipulate well-being data in
order to accomplish various policy objectives. After all, it is nearly

126. See supra Part II.B.4.
127. This is by no means the only conceivable welfarist governmental objective, as we
explained in detail in prior work. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 27, at 1632–
34.
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costless for an individual to answer untruthfully in response to a wellbeing survey. An individual who hoped to affect future policy
decisions could shade her response in order to make similar policy
choices appear more or less beneficial. For instance, suppose that
social conservatives in Washington State, where same-sex marriage
128
became legal in December 2012, wished to prevent it from being
legalized in other states as well. They might begin registering
extremely low levels of subjective well-being in the wake of the
legalization in order to make it appear to policymakers as if the law
has harmed overall well-being in the state.
This is a serious concern, but there are a number of potential
policy correctives. First, policymakers would ideally be collecting
well-being data on an ongoing (longitudinal) basis in order to
facilitate analysis of policy changes. This means that an individual in
Washington would be completing the same well-being survey after
the legalization of same-sex marriage that she was completing before
same-sex marriage was ever placed on the agenda. This would reduce
the salience of any given policy issue to survey respondents.
In addition, respondents would not know what policy issue their
responses would be used to analyze. Policymakers might use a given
set of responses to gauge the effects of same-sex marriage, or they
might use them to estimate the effects of a park being built across the
street or the installation of a new light-rail line. An individual who
reported artificially low (or high) well-being in an effort to hamper
(or promote) one type of project or regulation might well end up
influencing another instead.
Finally, policymakers could employ the same types of algorithms
that online reputation regimes (such as Zagat or eBay) use to detect
129
deliberately malicious feedback. These algorithms typically screen
for outliers—reports that are highly inconsistent with the vast
130
majority of other feedback on the same firm or individual. Here,
policymakers could conceivably use algorithms that screen out data
that are inconsistent with an individual’s other self-reports with no
128. See Laura L. Myers, Same-Sex Couples Wed in Washington State for First Time,
REUTERS, Dec. 9, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/09/us-usagaymarriage-idUSBRE8B801S20121209. We thank Lior Strahilevitz for raising this point and
suggesting this issue.
129. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (and Everything?), 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1732–37 (2006) (suggesting that similar algorithms could screen malicious
feedback in “How’s My Driving” programs).
130. Id. at 1733.
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discernible basis for the inconsistency. In some cases this might mean
throwing out useful information, but such screening algorithms have
131
nevertheless proven to be accuracy enhancing in other contexts.
More generally, online reputation regimes have remained fairly
reliable despite the strong incentives of particular individuals and
132
firms to spread misinformation. It is unlikely that well-being surveys
will fare worse.
Moreover, CBA is hardly immune from this type of problem. An
individual who responds to a contingent valuation survey has no
133
incentive to provide an accurate response. Thus, for instance, the
same social conservative might offer an artificially high answer when
asked how much she would be willing to pay to keep same-sex
marriage illegal. Similarly, an environmentally conscious individual
might provide an artificially high answer when asked how much she
would pay for cleaner skies. Sophisticated social scientists have
attempted to devise correctives to this issue, but it is impossible to
134
eliminate the problem entirely.
These types of problems are, if anything, more significant for
contingent valuation surveys than they are for well-being surveys. The
reason is that a contingent valuation survey necessarily highlights and
makes salient the policy choice in question—the individual is asked
how much she would pay for some policy outcome—which makes it
easier for an individual to provide a deliberately misleading answer.
The question at issue is not obscured, as it is within well-being
surveys. We will discuss contingent valuation surveys in much greater
depth in Part III. For the moment it suffices to note that the types of
highly charged political issues that might cause individuals to
manipulate well-being surveys would also cause them to manipulate
contingent valuation surveys, possibly to greater effect.

131. Id.
132. See id. at 1734 n.145 (“Collusive ratings are a problem for online feedback systems
generally, though eBay has been able to keep this problem at tolerable (albeit nonzero) levels to
date.”).
133. See Richard T. Carson & W. Michael Hanemann, Contingent Valuation, in 2
HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 821, 883 (Karl-Gran Maler & Jeffrey R. Vincent
eds., 2005) (“[P]eople only try to tell the truth when it is in their economic interest to do so.”).
Well-conducted contingent valuation studies attempt to control for these issues, but doing so is
difficult. See John C. Whitehead & Glenn C. Blomquist, Benefit-Cost Analysis, in HANDBOOK
ON CONTINGENT VALUATION 92, 103–04 (Anna Alberini & James R. Kahn eds., 2006).
134. See Carson & Hanemann, supra note 133, at 883 (explaining that respondents’
incentives to prevaricate “make[] the design of CV [contingent valuation] survey questions and
their analysis much more challenging”).
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C. Well-Being Analysis: An Example
How feasible is well-being analysis, and how would it differ from
cost-benefit analysis? To answer those questions, in this Section we
take an actual cost-benefit analysis conducted as part of an EPA
regulation and recalculate the costs and benefits of the regulation
using WBA.
This exercise actually stacks the deck overwhelmingly in favor of
CBA and against WBA. The actual CBA used here was the product
of decades of opportunities to refine CBA, and countless millions of
dollars spent on studying these phenomena and performing these
135
analyses. By contrast, this Section constitutes the first WBA that
has ever been conducted. There has never been any systematic
collection of well-being data related to any government project, much
less the regulation we analyze here.
For that reason, our analysis falls far short of the level of
accuracy that could be achieved were WBA to be adopted in practice.
Nonetheless, and strikingly, the WBA sketch we provide yields
results that are likely to be no less reliable than those of the costbenefit analysis that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
itself conducted. This demonstrates the inherent advantages of WBA,
the ease with which it could immediately be implemented, and the
potential for truly impressive results if it were conducted with the
resources currently available to CBA.
1. EPA Regulation of Pulp and Paper Production: A Cost-Benefit
136
Analysis. The regulation we examine was promulgated by the EPA
137
under the Clean Water Act in 1998 to curb toxic effluents from pulp
138
and paper mills. Prior to 1998, pulp, paper, and paperboard mills

135. See generally Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Comment, Why Cost-Benefit Analysis? A
Question (and Some Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1135 (2008)
(providing a general history of cost-benefit analysis).
136. Although our examples in the Introduction and Parts I and II have focused on clean-air
and clean-water regulations for the sake of clarity and consistency, everything we say in this
Article applies more generally to all regulations. We broaden our pool of examples in Parts III,
IV, and V.
137. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
138. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category: Pulp
and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New
Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504
(Apr. 15, 1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 63, 261 & 430). The regulation, 40 C.F.R. pt. 430, was
upheld by the D.C. Circuit. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2002). One
of us has written about this regulation before. Masur & Posner, supra note 15, at 680–87;
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used a number of chlorine-based chemicals in the normal
manufacturing process. Dioxin and furan, two carcinogens, are among
the byproducts that result from producing paper and paperboard with
139
these chlorine-based chemicals. Pulp and paper mills then released
those chemicals into the waterways in quantities great enough to
sicken and kill fish and cause a number of diseases, including cancer,
140
in humans who ate the fish.
The EPA considered three regulatory options. “Option A”
required the mills to substitute chlorine dioxide for elemental
chlorine in the production process, which reduces but does not
141
eliminate the discharge of dioxin and furan. “Option B” was a
stricter rule, combining the Option A limits and a requirement that
the mills eliminate lignin (a material in wood pulp), along with several
142
other restrictions on the manufacturing process. Option B would
have resulted in even lower emissions of dioxin and furan than
Option A. Finally, “Option TCF” (“totally chlorine free”), required
that pulp and paper mills eliminate all chlorine from the production
143
process, thereby also eliminating the discharge of furan and dioxin.
The EPA estimated that this regulation would produce several
different types of benefits. First, there would be fewer cancer deaths
among recreational and subsistence anglers who consume fish that
144
have swum near pulp and paper mills. The EPA refused to specify a
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 98
VA. L. REV. 579, 594–95 (2012). The EPA simultaneously regulated airborne emissions from
pulp and paper mills under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. IV
2011)), but for ease of explication we limit our examination here to the Clean Water Act
portion of the regulation.
139. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category: Pulp
and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New
Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category, 63 Fed. Reg. at 18,541–
43.
140. Id. at 18,565, 18,587.
141. Id. at 18,542–43.
142. Id. at 18,541–42.
143. Id. at 18,542.
144. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA CONTRACT NO. 68-C3-0302, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
FOR THE NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS FOR SOURCE
CATEGORY: PULP AND PAPER PRODUCTION; EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS GUIDELINES,
PRETREATMENT STANDARDS, AND NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: PULP, PAPER,
AND PAPERBOARD CATEGORY—PHASE 1, at 8-12 tbl.8-6 (1997), available at
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/pulppaper/upload/1997_11_13_guide_pulppaper_jd
_pulp.pdf (calculating the annual monetized benefits from a reduction in cancer cases). The
EPA also stated that the regulations would reduce the risk of noncancer illnesses but did not
report monetary estimates because of inadequate data. Id. at 8-14. In addition, the EPA
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single monetary value of life, instead announcing that each life saved
145
was worth between $2.5 and $9 million. However, it is worth noting
that these figures refer only to the value of the lives lost. The EPA
did not possess and did not employ data on the cost of being stricken
146
with cancer, above and apart from eventual mortality. Second,
reducing the quantity of dioxin released into fisheries would reduce
the number of “fish consumption advisories,” during which fishing
must cease, and thus increase the number of days that fishing could
147
take place. Third and finally, pulp and paper mills produce sludge,
which must be disposed of. Reducing the amount of dioxin and furan
in the sludge would allow the mills to dispose of the sludge via
148
cheaper means.
At the same time, the regulation also imposed significant costs.
Mills were forced to switch from chlorine-based chemicals to more
expensive alternatives and to treat their effluents before they were
149
released into the waterways. Table 1 lists the annual costs and
benefits, as calculated by the EPA, of all three options the agency
considered in its regulation of pulp and paper.

estimated that the regulation would reduce deaths among Native Americans who are
subsistence anglers. Id. at 8-15 tbl.8-8. It declined, however, to include this benefit within the
analysis because of uncertainty in the data. Id. at 4-15 Although this decision is probably
indefensible, we adhere to it here in the interest of parallelism between our WBA and the
EPA’s CBA.
145. Id. at 8-12 tbl.8-6.
146. We will attempt to approximate this cost—more accurately described as a benefit,
actually, because these are cancer cases avoided—in the WBA we perform below. See infra Part
II.C.2.
147. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 144, at 8-23. The EPA also surmised that more
anglers would elect to fish if toxic effluents were reduced, and it estimated the benefit of this
increased fishing at $4.7 to $15.5 million per year. Again, however, because of uncertainties in
the data, the EPA did not end up including these figures in its benefit estimate. Id. at 8-23, 8-24,
8-26 tbl.8-12. As with the benefits described above, we adhere to the EPA’s decision without
endorsing it.
148. Id. at 8-24.
149. See generally id. at 5-1 to 5-29 (discussing costs of implementing the rule).
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Table 1: Annual Costs and Benefits, EPA Pulp and Paper Regulation
150
(in millions of 1995 dollars)
Total
compliance
costs
Benefits of
cheaper sludge
disposal
Benefits of
eliminating
fishing
advisories
Monetized
benefits of
lives saved
Net benefits as
calculated by
the EPA
Median net
benefits

Option A

Option B

Option TCF

-262

-324

-1081

8–16

8–16

8–16

2.1–19.4

2.1–19.4

2.1–19.4

1.8–21.7

1.9–22.5

2.0–25.2

-250.9 –
-205.7

-312.0 –
-266.1

-1,084.4 –
-1,035.9

-228.3

-289

-542.5

As Table 1 makes clear, none of the options is cost-benefit
justified according to standard CBA methodologies. The EPA
selected Option A, which appears to do the least harm, yet even
under that option the costs exceed the benefits by more than $228
151
million per year.
In addition, and importantly for our analysis, the EPA calculated
that the regulation would lead to the loss of significant numbers of
jobs. The increased regulatory costs would increase pulp and paper
152
prices, reducing consumer demand for pulp and paper products.

150. This Table was assembled using data found in id. at 5-25 tbl.5-16, 5-28 tbl.5-18, 8-12
tbl.8-6, 8-23, 8-25, 8-45, 8-23, 8-26 tbl.8-12.
151. The EPA calculated that Option A coupled with regulation under the Clean Air Act
would result in net positive benefits, and so the agency’s eventual outcome is cost-benefit
justified. Id. at 8-27 tbl.8-13. Of course, this begs the question of why the EPA did not simply
regulate only under the Clean Air Act if it produced substantial net benefits whereas regulation
under the Clean Water Act produced substantial net costs.
152. See id. at 6-18 (“Although the mills stay open with a price increase, consumers pay the
price increase.”).
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This reduction in demand would force mills to lay off workers. As
pulp and paper production declined, suppliers and affiliated
industries would also suffer and be forced to lay off workers.
However, the EPA did not include these lost jobs in its cost-benefit
analysis. We suspect that this stemmed from a belief, which continues
to hold sway throughout the regulatory state, that workers will soon
find alternative employment and the net costs of unemployment will
154
be zero. This assumption is almost certainly false, and one of us has
separately criticized the EPA and other regulatory agencies for
refusing to include the costs of unemployment in their cost-benefit
155
analyses.
We calculate, in Table 2, a revised cost-benefit analysis that
includes unemployment costs. (The welfare costs of unemployment
will also figure prominently in the WBA that follows.) For ease of
explication, we list the compliance costs from Table 1 separately but
combine the median figures for the three types of benefits (cheaper
sludge disposal, elimination of fishing advisories, and lives saved) into
one row, which we label “Median total benefits.” It is worth noting
that the EPA did not estimate the total unemployment that would
result under Option TCF, though it did estimate the number of jobs
that would be eliminated under that Option due to pulp and paper
156
mill closures alone. Based upon those numbers, which we provide
below, the job loss from Option TCF would have likely been quite
substantial.

153.
154.
155.
156.

See id. at 6-19 tbl.6-6 (summarizing impact on employment).
See Masur & Posner, supra note 138, at 582.
Id. at 580–81.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 144, at 6-44 tlb. 6-19.
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Table 2: Annual Costs and Benefits, EPA Pulp and Paper Regulation,
157
Including Unemployment Costs (in millions of 1995 dollars)
Compliance
costs
Median total
benefits
Median net
benefits
excluding
unemployment
costs
Jobs lost from
plant closures
Total jobs lost
Estimated
annual
unemployment
158
costs
Median net
benefits
including
unemployment
costs

Option A

Option B

Option TCF

-262

-324

-1081

34.5

34.9

36.3

-228.3

-289

-542.5

400

900

7100

3094

5711

N/A

-10.2

-18.8

N/A

-238.5

-307.8

N/A

What should be immediately evident from Table 2 is that
regulatory-compliance costs—principally the costs of shifting to
nonchlorinated chemicals—dominate even this revised cost-benefit
analysis. Even for Option A, the least costly regulatory option, these
compliance costs are nearly ten times greater than the total estimated
benefits and more than twenty times greater than the costs related to
unemployment. It is not atypical for compliance costs to dominate the

157. This Table was assembled using data found in id. at 5-25 tbl.5-16, 5-28 tbl.5-18, 6-15
tbl.6-4, 6-34 tbl.6-14, 6-44 tbl.6-19.
158. This figure is based upon an estimated yearly cost of $3300 per unemployed worker.
See Masur & Posner, supra note 138, at 618 (“A conservative estimate is that an average worker
who loses his job in a mass layoff will suffer earnings losses of more than $100,000 over the rest
of his life . . . .”).
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cost side of the ledger in cost-benefit analysis. Industrial costs can be
very steep and easily monetized, and so they can dwarf other inputs
to the CBA. In addition, a glance back at Table 1 reveals that the
monetized benefits of reducing deaths from cancer are quite modest
when compared with the other benefits that the regulation will
provide. The monetized benefits from cheaper sludge removal and
fewer fishing advisories, in combination, exceed the benefits from
reducing the number of deaths from cancer. These are both
remarkable findings, and they shed light on the (possibly distorting)
effects of monetizing costs and benefits. What remains to be seen is
whether they are indicative of the true welfare effects of the
regulation. That is a question we address in the following Subsection.
2. The EPA’s Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Well-Being Analysis. In
this Subsection we reengineer the EPA’s cost-benefit analysis as a
well-being analysis. To do so, we convert the costs and benefits of the
regulation into well-being units. Wherever possible, we make this
conversion directly. That is, we translate the benefits of reduced
cancer deaths directly to WBUs, rather than adopting the EPA’s
159
pricing of those lives and then converting the dollars into WBUs.
All calculations are based on a well-being scale that runs from 0.0 to
10.0. What follows is a summary of the conversion of each of the costs
and benefits involved.
a. Compliance Costs, Sludge Disposal, and Fewer Fishing
Advisories. Compliance costs and the benefits of cheaper sludge
disposal are both entirely monetary. Ideally we would measure the
welfare value of fewer fishing advisories by estimating the hedonic
value of fishing and multiplying it by the additional hours that anglers
will be able to spend engaged in that activity. However, to our
knowledge hedonic data on fishing does not yet exist. Accordingly,
we use the EPA’s monetary estimate of this benefit. We sum these
three quantities to determine the aggregate monetary cost of the
regulation.
The next question is how to translate that monetary cost into
WBUs. These expenditures will have an effect on well-being only to
the extent that they are paid for and felt by individuals. Some of the
159. We do not apply a discount rate in this WBA because it is uncertain whether
discounting would be appropriate in WBA. See infra Part V. As we explain in Part V, this is a
potential strength of WBA, rather than a weakness. If further research reveals that discounting
is appropriate, it would be straightforward to discount costs and benefits accordingly.
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benefits will accrue to the anglers who are able to fish with fewer
interruptions. Compliance costs and sludge-related benefits will be
borne by some combination of consumers of pulp and paper and
shareholders in pulp and paper companies. (The exact division
depends on the extent to which pulp and paper firms are able to pass
their costs along to consumers.)
It is impossible to know precisely how many households will
share these costs, though nearly every household consumes paper to
some degree. For purposes of this analysis we assume that the
monetary costs and benefits will be equally borne by one million
160
Americans. Each individual will bear several hundred dollars in net
monetary costs, depending upon the regulatory option. We also
assume that each individual earns the median household income,
161
which in 1998 was $38,885.
What effect will these monetary costs have on welfare? Studies
have found that life satisfaction increases logarithmically with
income. We use the results of one of the largest and most recent of
these studies, which found that an approximately threefold increase in
162
income was associated with a 0.11 increase in WBUs. (Similarly, a
163
two-thirds decrease was associated with a 0.11 decrease in WBUs.)
That is, an individual whose income increased from $100,000 per year
to $272,000 per year would gain 0.11 WBUs per year. If that same
individual’s income decreased from $100,000 to $36,700, she would
lose 0.11 WBUs. The total gain or loss is given by the following
formula:

160. Because the total dollar cost is a constant number, our analysis is largely unaffected by
whether that total cost is spread across virtually everyone who consumes paper products (say,
200 million Americans) or a much smaller subset (say, 1 million). The only difference is that if
the total is borne by a smaller subset rather than spread across everyone, then each person
affected must pay a higher amount. That results in a larger effect of cost on well-being, given
that money affects welfare in a logarithmic rather than linear fashion. See infra note 162 and
accompanying text. We anticipate that our analysis may be criticized for placing too little weight
on the value of money, so we choose the smaller number of 1 million (as opposed to, say, 200
million or everyone) purely to make the most conservative possible assumption. That is, we
accentuate the welfare effects of lost income, and those effects are still small. Our calculation on
this point should thus be considered an upper bound on the welfare effect of monetary costs for
a regulation of this type.
161. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES, at v (1998), available
at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-206.pdf.
162. Nattavudh Powdthavee & Bernard van den Berg, Putting Different Price Tags on the
Same Health Condition: Re-evaluating the Well-Being Valuation Approach, 30 J. HEALTH ECON.
1032, 1038 tbl.3 (2011).
163. Id.
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(1) Welfare loss due to income decline
= 0.11 WBUs × (ln (new income) – ln (old income))
We apply this formula to the income loss caused by the net costs of
EPA’s regulation in Table 3, below.
b. Cancer Cases Avoided. The EPA provided a range of
estimates for the number of cases of cancer that will be avoided under
each regulatory option. In the interest of simplicity, we base our
calculations on the median number. There are limited available data
on the welfare loss that an individual experiences when she is sick
with cancer, but one study calculated the welfare loss from
“stomach/liver/kidneys or digestive problems,” which we believe is
164
the closest analog. That welfare loss is 0.238 WBUs per year while
165
the person is sick. We assume that the typical individual who dies
from cancer caused by dioxin and furan effluents is sick with cancer
166
for two years and then dies thirty years before she normally would.
This is obviously a rough assumption, but it is no rougher than the
EPA’s assumption that all lives are equivalently valuable and have a
167
median value of $5.75 million. The average American has a life
168
satisfaction of 7.4 (again, on a scale of 0.0 to 10.0). When an
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. To arrive at this number, we begin by noting that the average American lifespan is 78
years. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 77 (2012). If
anglers were evenly distributed across age categories, then the average angler would be 39 years
old, meaning that saving such a person from death would save them nearly 40 years of life. In
recognition that our well-being numbers may be criticized for valuing life much more heavily
than does CBA, we “round down” to make a very conservative estimate of 30 years.
167. See infra Parts III.A.1, IV.B.
168. See Ed Diener & Carol Diener, Most People Are Happy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 181, 182 tbl.1
(1996). Studies have shown that older individuals are typically happier than younger and
middle-aged people. Yang Yang, Social Inequalities in Happiness in the United States, 1972 to
2004: An Age-Period Cohort Analysis, 73 AM. SOC. REV. 204, 213 (2008). Individuals who do
not become sick and die from cancer as a result of this regulation will be adding years to the end
of their lives, when they are happiest. Accordingly, by using the average American life
satisfaction figure we will tend to underestimate slightly the benefits of avoiding cancer.
One potential problem from using these data is that individuals might not assign a
value of 0 to death or nonexistence when using a hedonic scale that runs from 0 to 10. Some
individuals might use 0, the bottom end of the scale, to indicate states that are worse than
nonexistence, such as intense pain. If that is the case, then death or nonexistence might register
as some small, non-zero number. Our concerns may be entirely unwarranted, and even if they
were to prove accurate they would have little impact on the WBA we perform. Nonetheless, it is
for this reason that we generally advocate using a scale that runs from -10 to 10. See supra Part
II.A.
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individual dies, she loses all of the welfare that she might otherwise
169
have experienced throughout the remaining years of her life. Thus,
we calculate the welfare benefit from avoiding one fatal case of
cancer by the following equation:
(2) Welfare benefit from avoided fatal cancer
= 2 × (0.238 WBUs) + 30 × (7.4 WBUs) = 222.48 WBUs
c. Unemployment. Unemployment is one condition about which
there exists substantial hedonic data. Studies indicate that
170
unemployment has a significant impact on well-being. Unemployed
individuals suffer a loss of 0.83 WBUs per year during the time that
171
they remain unemployed. Even after finding new employment,
these same individuals lose an average of 0.34 WBUs per year during
172
the next seven years after they begin working again.
For purposes of this WBA, we assume that the average person
who becomes unemployed as a result of this regulation is out of work
for six months. This corresponds roughly to the median duration of
173
unemployment in the years 2011 and 2012. Each unemployed
individual thus loses 0.83 × 0.5 = 0.415 WBUs during the period of
unemployment. In addition, she loses 0.34 WBUs per year for the

169. We do not include any benefits to the family or friends of individuals who do not
develop cancer because CBA typically does not include these third-party benefits. See Sean
Williams, Statistical Children, 30 YALE J. ON REG., 101, 103 (2013).
170. Richard E. Lucas, Adaptation and the Set-Point Model of Subjective Well-Being: Does
Happiness Change After Major Life Events?, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 75, 77
(2007); Lucas et al., supra note 66, at 11.
171. See Lucas et al., supra note 66, at 11.
172. See Lucas, supra note 170, at 77; Lucas et al., supra note 66, at 11. Lucas and his
coauthors do not have data past the 7-year mark (nor does anyone else), and we are reluctant to
speculate as to what future studies might reveal. Four German scholars have also recently
conducted an excellent study of the effect of current (but not past) unemployment on momentby-moment happiness. Andreas Knabe, Steffen Rätzel, Ronni Schöb & Joachim Weimann,
Dissatisfied with Life, but Having a Good Day: Time-Use and Well-Being of the Unemployed 2
(CESifo Working Paper No. 2604, 2009), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/
ces/ceswps/_2604.html. This is precisely the sort of data that we hope policymakers will collect in
the service of analyzing regulations via WBA. We do not incorporate this study in our analysis
because all of our other data comes from life satisfaction studies, and it would complicate the
analysis substantially if we were to attempt to combine these different types of data.
173. See BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HOUSEHOLD DATA: ANNUAL
AVERAGES, at tbl.30 (2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsa2012.pdf (showing that the
median duration of unemployment for full-time workers was 24.1 weeks in 2011 and 21.8 weeks
in 2012).
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seven years following reemployment, for a total of 0.34 × 7.0 = 2.38
WBUs.
The EPA’s CBA presents only yearly costs and benefits, not
total costs and benefits. The agency annualized all costs over a 30174
year period. However, the agency calculated total (as opposed to
yearly) unemployment. Accordingly, we divide the hedonic costs of
being unemployed by 30 to obtain the yearly costs, similarly
annualized over a 30-year period. The hedonic effect of the
unemployment caused by the EPA’s pulp and paper regulation is
given by the following equation:
(3) Welfare cost of unemployment per job lost
= (-0.83 × 0.5 – 0.34 × 7.0)/30 = -0.093 WBUs
We are now prepared to aggregate the welfare effects of the
various costs and benefits. Table 3 presents the WBA of the EPA’s
regulation.

174. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 144, at 4-23.
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Table 3: Well-Being Analysis of EPA’s Pulp and Paper Regulation
Net monetary
costs (millions of
1995 $)
Welfare effects
of net monetary
costs (WBUs)
Median cases of
cancer avoided
Welfare effects
of avoided
cancer cases
(WBUs)
Total jobs lost
Welfare effects
of
unemployment
(WBUs)
Total welfare
effect (WBUs)

175

Option A

Option B

Option TCF

-239.25

-301.25

-1058.25

-0.00068

-0.00086

-0.00304

1.57

1.62

1.79

349.29

360.42

398.24

3094

5711

N/A

-287.74

-531.12

N/A

61.55

-170.70

N/A

This WBA diverges from the EPA’s CBA in two particularly
notable respects. First, Option A now appears welfare justified: it will
increase overall well-being in the net. Option B is still not welfare
justified, but it appears less egregiously harmful than it did through
the lens of cost-benefit analysis. The EPA may well have been correct
to choose Option A (rather than not regulating at all), contrary to
what CBA would indicate. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
the monetary costs of the regulation, which dominated the CBA, are
nearly irrelevant here. Instead, the benefits of saving lives and the
costs of unemployment produce the dominant welfare effects. This

175. This Table was assembled using data found at National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category: Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent
Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp,
Paper, and Paperboard Category, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504, 18,588, 18,591 (Apr. 15, 1998) (codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 63, 261 & 430); and U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 144, at 6-34 tbl.614, 8-45.

BBM IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/15/2013 2:54 PM

WBA vs. CBA

1645

may appear surprising to scholars steeped in cost-benefit analysis, but
it is entirely consistent with reams of evidence demonstrating that
changes in wealth and income have extremely small impacts on
176
individual well-being.
This is not to say that policymakers should begin ignoring the
effects of their regulations on wealth. As we explain in Part III.D,
regulations that increase welfare at the expense of vast amounts of
wealth might eventually become self-defeating and eliminate future
opportunities for welfare gains. This is why we would not rule out
preserving CBA as a complement to WBA. But the WBA we
perform here makes clear the distortions introduced by CBA’s focus
on wealth and monetization. Regulations that do not appear costbenefit justified might in fact be found to greatly enhance welfare
once that welfare is measured more directly.
Of course, we present here only a back-of-the-envelope sketch of
a WBA. Our conclusion that the EPA’s pulp and paper regulation
was welfare-enhancing is necessarily tentative and dependent upon
our assumptions, which may be incorrect. But this exercise should
demonstrate the feasibility of WBA as a workable decision tool. It is
possible to conduct a full-scale WBA of a major regulation using only
the scattered data currently available. With sustained effort and
attention on the part of the regulatory state, WBA could
revolutionize the accuracy with which prospective laws are evaluated.
III. WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND WELL-BEING
To translate costs and benefits into dollars, cost-benefit analysis
relies upon measures of how much individuals are willing to pay to
177
acquire benefits or avoid harms. These so-called “willingness to

176. For a review of the extensive literature, see Ed Diener & Robert Biswas-Diener, Will
Money Increase Subjective Well-being? A Literature Review and Guide to Needed Research, 57
SOC. INDICATORS RES. 119, 120–51 (2002). These findings are also congruent with the emphasis
that advocates of feasibility analysis have long placed on job loss, as opposed to other types of
monetary costs. See, e.g., David Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and
Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2005).
177. Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931, 945
(2000) (“In mainstream cost-benefit analysis, the primary work of valuation is done by the use
of willingness to pay.”). Some cost-benefit studies instead examine subjects’ willingness to
accept money in exchange for sacrificing a benefit or bearing a cost. These willingness-to-accept
(WTA) measures often yield different results than do WTP measures, but the methodologies
used to determine them are effectively identical, and the problems that affect WTP similarly
plague WTA. See generally John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of
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pay” (WTP) measures are determined in two types of ways. In some
cases, economists attempt to measure individual valuations through
studies of revealed preferences—studies that demonstrate how much
individuals are implicitly willing to pay to gain some benefit or willing
178
to accept to bear some harm. For instance, some studies center on
the wage premium for workers who take dangerous jobs: they
examine how much more a firm must pay a worker to accept a job
that carries some type of risk, thus revealing the price a worker would
179
put on avoiding that risk. Sometimes, however, cost-benefit analysis
must place prices on costs or benefits that are not traded in a robust
180
marketplace, such as clean air. In these cases, in which revealed
preferences are unavailable, economists rely upon surveys that ask
respondents hypothetically how much they would be willing to pay to
procure a particular benefit or eliminate a particular harm. These
surveys are known as stated-preference (in contrast to revealed
181
preference) or contingent valuation studies.
Both revealed preference studies and contingent valuation
studies are fraught with difficulties and error. These difficulties have
led to challenging theoretical and methodological disputes among
CBA’s proponents, and they are widely cited as undermining the
validity and reliability of cost-benefit analysis. Nevertheless, costbenefit analysis continues to rely upon them because it is believed
that there is no viable alternative. Yet well-being analysis, if
WTA/WTP Studies, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 426 (2002). Accordingly, we use WTP here as
shorthand to mean WTP or WTA.
178. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 76 (1995) (“[P]eople reveal the values they attach to various goods through their actual
behavior in market or market-like settings. If we attend to the choices people actually make, we
will be able to infer from them the valuations assigned to various goods.”).
179. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 46–47 (1998) (“[R]isky jobs must be
attractive in some other way, such as higher pay, for workers to be willing to bear the risk.”).
180. Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1557 (2002) (“Since there are no natural
prices for a healthy environment, cost-benefit analysis requires the creation of artificial ones.”);
Miriam Montesinos, Comment, It May Be Silly, but It’s an Answer: The Need To Accept
Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 26 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 48, 49–50 (1999) (“The problem with placing values on natural resources is that natural
resources are not market commodities and therefore do not have market prices.”).
181. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Ilana Ritov, Karen E. Jacowitz & Paul Grant, Stated
Willingness To Pay for Public Goods: A Psychological Perspective, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 310, 310
(1993) (“Hundreds of contingent valuations have been carried out in the last two
decades . . . .”); Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 178, at 80 (“Rather than looking at actual choices,
these methods ask people hypothetical questions about how much they would be willing to pay
to avoid certain harms or conditions.”).
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conducted properly, could in fact ameliorate or even eliminate many
of the difficulties endemic to willingness-to-pay measures. The
Sections that follow describe some of the most important sources of
error involved in the measurement of willingness to pay and explain
how well-being analysis could constitute an improvement or
supplement to the status quo.
A. Revealed Preferences
CBA’s preferred method for quantifying costs and benefits is to
examine what actual consumers of a good (such as workplace safety
182
or clean air) were willing to pay to acquire that good. These
revealed preference studies are particularly common in the context of
workplace hazards: there are many studies of the wage premiums
183
paid to workers who take dangerous jobs. Indeed, CBA prices lives
primarily by using wage premiums—the amount by which the wages
of dangerous jobs exceed those of jobs that are safe but otherwise
184
comparable. If, for example, a job with an annual death risk of 2 in
10,000 paid $100 more per year than a comparable job with an annual
risk of death of 1 in 10,000, that would imply that workers had priced
their lives at $1 million (10,000 x $100). According to this approach,
high wage premiums reveal that people value their lives a lot, because
they need to be paid a lot in order to incur the risk of death. Low
wage premiums mean the opposite.
The value of a life is central to CBA in part because so many
regulations involve trading off some good (such as consumer costs)
185
against a risk of death from injury or disease. Accordingly, accurate
186
calculations of the value of life are absolutely essential to CBA. In

182. See, e.g., Edna T. Loehman, Sehoon Park & David Boldt, Willingness To Pay for Gains
and Losses in Visibility and Health, 70 LAND ECON. 476, 479–85 (1994) (examining how much
people would pay for improved air quality).
183. See Viscusi, supra note 47, at 312–13 (noting that the literature on wage-risk trade-offs
has become the basis for government policy).
184. See, e.g., id. (“Estimates from the U.S. labor market indicate that a worker currently
would require an annual wage premium of $700 to face a fatality risk of 1/10,000 . . . .”); see also,
e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 47, at 5-28 (illustrating how the value of a
statistical life increases as the cancer latency period decreases).
185. See Revesz, supra note 11, at 943 (“The primary benefit of many important
environmental statutes, as determined by the dollar value assigned by cost-benefit analysis, is
the human lives that are saved.”).
186. Id. at 943–44 (“Thus, in determining whether a particular regulation can be justified on
cost-benefit grounds, the central questions revolve around the value assigned to the lives that
would be saved by the program.”).
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addition, revealed preference studies can be used to price other
goods, such as clean air or a new road or park, by looking at those
goods’ effect on housing prices.
Yet these revealed preference studies have many potential
sources of error. The error sources fall loosely into three categories:
informational and computational problems, wealth effects, and
affective forecasting difficulties. The first two could conceivably be
overcome at significant effort and expense; the third is likely
insuperable. WBA, by contrast, offers a solution to many of the most
difficult of these problems.
1. Informational and Computational Problems. Economists favor
revealed preference studies because they focus on individuals’ actual
187
economic decisions. However, that means that these studies must
rely on individuals to make accurate and informed decisions
regarding their own welfare. Errors in individual decisionmaking will
lead to errors in the measurement of costs and benefits. The problems
with this approach are particularly manifest in the context of wagepremium studies, and they are manifold.
First, wage-premium studies assume that people are able to
assimilate a 1-in-10,000 risk of death so as to decide whether they
prefer avoiding that risk or earning extra money. But empirical
188
189
evidence contradicts that assumption. In study after study, “survey
respondents display[] an utter inability to modulate their willingness
to pay for increases in safety according to how much those safety

187. See Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuations, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 315
(1989) (“Contingent valuation is controversial, however, because it is entirely hypothetical and
because it assumes that people respond to the survey as they would to a marketplace
transaction. . . . Economists are much more comfortable measuring revealed preferences in
genuine market sales.”).
188. See Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1331–37 (2007)
(“Study after study has demonstrated that individuals experience great difficulty, purely as a
matter of estimation and intuition, when dealing with high-magnitude, low-probability
threats.”).
189. Young Sook Eom, Pesticide Residue Risk and Food Safety Valuation: A Random Utility
Approach, 76 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 760, 769 (1994); M.W. Jones-Lee, M. Hammerton & P.R.
Philips, The Value of Safety: Results of a National Sample Survey, 95 ECON. J. 49, 65–66 (1985);
Michael W. Jones-Lee, Graham Loomes & P.R. Philips, Valuing the Prevention of Non-Fatal
Road Injuries: Contingent Valuation vs. Standard Gambles, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 676, 688
(1995); C.T. Jordan Lin & J. Walter Milon, Contingent Valuation of Health Risk Reductions for
Shellfish Products, in VALUING FOOD SAFETY AND NUTRITION 83, 96–97 (J.A. Caswell ed.,
1995); V. Kerry Smith & William H. Desvousges, An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Value
of Risk Changes, 95 J. POL. ECON. 89, 100 tbl.2 (1987).
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increases actually would diminish the probability of harm.” People’s
minds are not designed to differentiate between exceedingly small
risks and infinitesimally small risks, and when asked to do so
191
rationally, they frequently fail. As a result, small differences in pay
between certain risky jobs and certain safe jobs cannot be attributed
to a rational demand by workers to be compensated appropriately for
the risk.
Second, most wage-premium studies are based on the
assumption that workers know the actual mortality risk (1 in 10,000,
192
for example) of their job. There is no reason to believe that this is
so, and if it is not, then the studies’ validity breaks down; one cannot
rationally demand a specific amount of extra money in return for a
specific amount of risk if one does not know what the amount of risk
is.
Third, even if people could assimilate these low-probability
numbers and knew the actual mortality risk of their jobs, they might
act on such knowledge in ways other than demanding slightly more
money for those jobs. For example, they might choose to incur the
cost of being more careful on the job rather than incur the cost of
taking a safer job that they enjoy less. Such a choice would fulfill
CBA’s dubious assumption of economic rationality while still
rendering grossly inaccurate the life-value numbers arising from
CBA.
Fourth, it may be that 1-in-10,000 risks of death are simply too
fine-grained for regression analysis to detect. There are countless
differences between one job and another. Even a careful CBA study
that identifies a few dozen of those differences has necessarily left out
scores of smaller ones. The small risk to life, if it is traded off at all by
workers, could be traded off against these smaller differences rather
than the larger ones that are visible to econometricians. Indeed,
CBA’s wage premiums seem to fluctuate for reasons independent of
risk to life. For example, when unions in the trucking industry lost

190. Masur, supra note 188, at 1335.
191. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J.
61, 73–74 (2002) (“For most of us, most of the time, the relevant differences—between, say,
1/100,000 and 1/1,000,000—are not pertinent to our decisions, and by experience we are not well
equipped to take those differences into account.”).
192. See Maureen Cropper, James K. Hammitt & Lisa A. Robinson, Valuing Mortality Risk
Reductions: Progress and Challenges, 3 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 313, 317 (2011)
(“[E]stimates of VSL based on hedonic wage equations assume that the measure of job risk
used by the researcher matches workers’ risk perceptions.”).
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some of their capacity to influence management, drivers’ wages failed
193
to keep pace with those of comparable jobs in other industries.
Developments like that one, which had nothing to do with workers’
tolerance for risk, resulted in CBA’s use of lower wage-premium
194
numbers (and thus lower values for life). In theory, one might say
that a perfect CBA would isolate the value of risk by accounting for
union power and everything else like it that can affect wages. But this
has been difficult in practice, and it might be impossible even in
theory. No two jobs are truly equivalent in every relevant feature
except their risk to life. And even if there were two such jobs, they
could not remain equivalent over time, because their wages would be
affected in different ways by economic developments independent of
risk.
In light of these problems, it should not be surprising that wagepremium studies have produced widely variant values of life. Studies
using similar methodologies have set the value of a statistical life as
195
low as $100,000 and as high as $76,000,000. Such large variation in
the results of the studies casts doubt on their reliability and validity
and suggests that random noise or unmeasured variables, rather than
rational risk trade-offs, account for the numbers.
WBA, by contrast, sidesteps nearly all of these problems. WBA
does not require that individuals understand the risk of death in the

193. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 87 (“Average real wages for truck
drivers declined 30 percent between 1977 and 1995, due to the combination of deregulation and
the declining power of the Teamsters union . . . .”); MICHAEL H. BELZER, SWEATSHOPS ON
WHEELS: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN TRUCKING DEREGULATION 21–22 (2000) (“While
unions . . . represented about 60% of all truck drivers twenty years ago, today they represent
less than 25% of all drivers.”).
194. See, e.g., Janusz R. Mrozek & Laura O. Taylor, What Determines the Value of Life? A
Meta-Analysis, 21 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 253, 266–70 (2002) (“Restricting the sample of
workers to 100 percent unionized workers resulted in larger VSL estimates . . . .”). Some studies
attempt to control for unionization. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates with
Risks by Occupation and Industry, 42 J. ECON. INQUIRY 29, 36 (2004).
195. Mrozek & Taylor, supra note 194, at 254; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
VALUING MORTALITY RISK REDUCTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: A WHITE PAPER 85
tbl.4 (2010), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwan/ee-0563-1.pdf/$file/ee0563-1.pdf (compiling data from many hedonic wage studies into a table). Another indication of
the spread of possible results from such studies is a compilation of 37 hedonic wage studies that
EPA recently assembled. As calculated by the authors, the standard deviation of the values of
life among those 37 studies was $14.1 million, or approximately twice the value that EPA
currently places on a statistical life. See id.; see also W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value
of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 5, 19 tbl.2 (2003) (summarizing a series of hedonic wage studies performed over
the last three decades that identify VSLs ranging from $0.5 million to $20.8 million).
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workplace, nor must they be able to accurately grasp what it means to
face a 1-in-100,000 risk. Under WBA, an individual is only required to
report her current state of well-being accurately, a far simpler
cognitive task. There is no need to assume that individuals make
perfectly rational choices under conditions of perfect information.
The value of an individual life can be measured simply by aggregating
the positive and negative moments in that life, as reported by the
individual.
WBA also eliminates some of the need to perform complicated
regression analysis in order to compare similarly situated jobs or
marketplace goods. Here, WBA’s advantage lies in the ability to take
advantage of longitudinal studies. Suppose that an agency is
attempting to value the cost of a case of emphysema (in terms of pain,
suffering, and diminution in the quality of life) to analyze a regulation
that would protect workers from contracting emphysema in the
workplace. CBA would examine the wages paid to workers in
industries in which emphysema is a workplace hazard, and then using
regression analysis, it would attempt to isolate the wage premium that
is attributable directly to the risk of emphysema. This is an extremely
difficult endeavor, as we explained. WBA, on the other hand, would
simply look at the well-being of a given individual before and after she
contracted emphysema. The post-emphysema loss in well-being
represents the hedonic cost of the disease, a cost which the agency
can then weigh against other hedonic costs and benefits. Economists
have already made use of large sets of social-survey data to conduct
196
exactly these types of studies.
We hasten to add that this approach will not eliminate the need
for regression analysis entirely. Other circumstances in the
individual’s life may have changed during the same time period. For
instance, her disease may have forced her to take a different job,
reducing her wages. WBA will have to account for these changes as
well, using regression analysis, but the problem will be much simpler.
Because the study will involve the same individuals at multiple
different times, it will not be necessary to control for nearly so many
variables. That CBA cannot similarly utilize longitudinal studies, and
must instead rely on how much money a (potentially uninformed)
individual would pay or accept at a given instant, is just one of its
methodological shortcomings.
196. See generally Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 106 (using a longitudinal study to
determine the hedonic cost of disability).
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2. Wealth Effects. It has long been understood that the value an
individual places on a risk or a benefit will necessarily be affected by
197
that individual’s wealth. A millionaire might think nothing of paying
$10,000 to breathe slightly cleaner air, but someone who must support
a family on $25,000 per year will be much more hesitant to make the
same trade-off. Similarly, wealthy people rarely take high-risk jobs
because the wage premium is worth less to them and is insufficient to
compensate them for the risk. The reason is not that the benefit or
risk involved is greater for the wealthier person (though there may be
slight differences). Rather, wealth effects are driven by the fact that
198
the money is worth less to the wealthy person. Because cost-benefit
analysis involves translating harms and benefits into dollars, these
“wealth effects” will affect cost-benefit calculations.
Wealth effects play a large and undeniable role in wage-premium
studies, yet CBA cannot fully account for these effects. The fact that
rich and poor people (who presumably care equally, or at least
comparably, about staying alive) would be willing to pay vastly
different amounts to avoid a 1-in-10,000 risk of death illustrates the
inadequacy of this metric for valuing lives. WBA circumvents these
issues entirely by valuing lives based on individuals’ own assessments
of their well-being.
Yet the problem of wealth effects for revealed preference studies
and CBA is even more general. To demonstrate this, let us abstract
away from wage studies to more general methods for utilizing
revealed preferences. In theory, an agency employing CBA could use
197. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 195, at 36–43 (finding an income elasticity between 0.5
and 0.6, such that a 10 percent rise in income would increase WTP by 5 to 6 percent); see also
Thomas Kniesner, W. Kip Viscusi & James P. Ziliak, Policy Relevant Heterogeneity in the Value
of Statistical Life: New Evidence from Panel Data Quantile Regressions, 40 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 14, 28 (2010) (finding an income elasticity approaching or exceeding 1.0, such
that a 10 percent rise in income would increase WTP by more than 10 percent); W. Kip Viscusi,
The Heterogeneity of the Value of Statistical Life: Introduction and Overview, 40 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 1, 7–11 (2010) (summarizing more recent research finding that WTP values are
more sensitive to income than previously thought).
198. The reason is the declining marginal value of money. See, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, The
Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1599 n.88 (2009) (“Even rights
denominated in dollars cannot meaningfully be compared to each other without considering
how people value those dollars. Due to the declining marginal value of money, most people
value the liberty to spend $100,000 less than 100 times the amount that they value the liberty to
spend $1000.”); Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Borders and the Environment, 39
ENVTL. L. 141, 155 n.64 (2009) (“Of course, richer people lose more money when they miss a
day of work due to illness than do poor people, but the declining marginal value of money
means that what they lose may not be as valuable as the smaller in magnitude losses incurred by
the poorer people.”).

BBM IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/15/2013 2:54 PM

WBA vs. CBA

1653

housing prices or other data that reflect the benefits and costs of
living under various conditions in order to put a value on those
199
conditions. Imagine, for instance, that an agency is attempting to
put a dollar figure on the cost of having a nearby factory that emits
noxious fumes. The agency could compare housing prices in locations
with clean air and locations with noxious fumes and use multivariate
regression to isolate the effect of the noxious fumes on those prices.
This represents a particularly advanced method for revealing
preferences in that the method can encompass circumstances in which
individuals are not directly exchanging money for a good.
Now imagine a government project—a waste storage facility, for
instance—that will create noxious fumes, resulting in a uniform
decrease in well-being of everyone within range of those fumes, but
will have overall positive effects more generally. This project can be
located in a rich area with 500 very wealthy people or a poor area
with 1000 people. Imagine that the agency is able to determine that
the 500 wealthy people would be willing to pay $50,000 each to avoid
having the waste storage facility placed in their neighborhood,
whereas the poorer people would be willing to pay $10,000 each.
If the agency that is deciding where to site the project can tax
and transfer as part of the project, the solution—purely from the
perspective of welfare economics—is clear. The government should
locate the project in the poor area and make a compensating transfer
from the wealthy to the poor. The wealthy people would prefer to
pay, say, $25,000 per person to avoid having the project located in
their neighborhood, and that would be enough money to compensate
the poorer people such that they would prefer to accept the money
and the facility over receiving neither. If such a transfer were also to
make the poorer people happier on balance, then both CBA and
WBA would recommend that the agency pursue that course.
Suppose, however, that the agency cannot implement the
transfer and this first-best solution is unavailable. If the agency is
using CBA based upon actual willingness-to-pay statistics from the
two areas, it could find that the 500 wealthy people are willing to pay
more to avoid the noxious fumes (500 × $50,000 = $25 million) than
the 1000 poor people (1000 × $10,000 = $10 million), purely because
of wealth effects. It thus might end up locating the project in the poor
area rather than the wealthy area. But doing so will actually lead to a
199. See Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1276–80
(2008) (describing such a methodology and using it to value certain legal changes).
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greater reduction in welfare than locating the project in the wealthy
area, simply because there are more people who will be affected by
the project in the poorer neighborhood.
By contrast, a decisionmaker employing WBA would pick up on
the actual welfare effects of these two options and realize that the
welfare loss will be greater if the project is located in the poor area
than if it is located in the wealthy area, because it will affect twice the
number of people in the poor area. It will site the project in the
wealthier area. An agency using WBA will thus arrive at the secondbest solution; an agency employing CBA will select only the third200
best option.
This phenomenon is much more general. Any time a government
agency must decide between two projects—or two locations for the
same project—one of which will affect wealthy people and the other
of which will affect poor people, it risks being led astray by wealth
effects if it looks at the actual populations of people who will be
affected. It may be led to believe that the “wealthy” project will have
a greater effect on welfare than the “poor” project, simply because of
the impact of wealth on willingness to pay. When the agency cannot
tax and transfer—and nearly all agencies lack that authority—it will
err and select the wrong project. WBA, on the other hand, would not
be confused by wealth effects. WBA does not require that costs and
benefits be translated into dollars, and so the wealth of the affected
population cannot confound the analysis.
CBA could conceivably address the wealth/welfare disconnect by
applying distributional weights to costs and benefits. For instance,
CBA might value a dollar of costs or benefits more if it is experienced
by a poor person and less if it is experienced by a rich individual. The
greater an individual’s wealth, the less a dollar of cost or benefit
201
experienced by that person would affect the CBA. The main
problem with this approach is that it is difficult or impossible to

200. In addition, if the agency chose the second-best solution and located the project in the
wealthy area, residents of that neighborhood could conceivably bargain with residents of the
poorer neighborhood to have the project moved in exchange for a side payment. This bargain is
of course unlikely; transaction costs or legal barriers might prevent it. But it is at least possible.
No such Coasean bargain is possible if the project is located in the poor neighborhood because
the poorer people do not have the funds to pay off the wealthier people.
201. See Matthew D. Adler, Equity by the Numbers: Measuring Poverty, Inequality, and
Injustice (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (proposing a
means of attempting to assign equity weights to costs and benefits experienced by populations at
different levels of wealth).
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determine what those distributive weights should be; an individual’s
202
marginal utility of money is essentially unknowable. This may be
part of the reason that CBA has never adopted distributional weights
of this type.
3. Affective Forecasting Errors. Some of the problems with CBA
that we outline in the preceding Sections—informational and
computational difficulties, and wealth effects—could conceivably be
cured via enormous expenditures on data collection and the use of
203
extremely delicate and sophisticated statistical methods.
No
practitioner of CBA has come close to implementing these types of
solutions, though they remain theoretically possible.
However, revealed preference studies suffer from an additional
incurable flaw, one that WBA does not share. The flaw is that they
rely upon affective forecasting: the prediction of how an individual
will feel about an event or a condition before it happens. This is an
activity with which individuals often struggle greatly. Imagine a
government project that improves air quality in a particular location.
Suppose that an agency wishes to place a monetary value on this
cleaner air using housing prices in a revealed preferences study. The
theory behind using housing prices to measure the value of this
project is that individuals will pay more to live in the locality once its
air quality has been improved. In theory, then, home prices in the
204
affected area will depend upon how much both current homeowners
205
and prospective purchasers value the improved air quality.
Inevitably, these valuations require comparisons between what it is
like to live in areas with better and worse air qualities. Thus, the
current homeowner must remember what the air was like before the
improvement and estimate her welfare loss from returning to such a
202. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax, 23 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 607, 617 (1996) (explaining that there is no way to determine an individual’s marginal
utility of money).
203. As we have discussed, some of these problems also implicate WBA, though not to the
same degree.
204. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Role of Hope in Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1661,
1666 (1997) (analyzing a hypothetical “suggest[ing] . . . that a [homeowner]’s hopes or
aspirations influence negotiation analysis and behavior”).
205. See Paul Boudreaux, An Individual Preference Approach to Suburban Racial
Desegregation, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 533, 547 (1999) (“Housing prices are affected by buyers’
desires for certain amenities, such as air conditioning, a large kitchen or a driveway. Housing
prices will vary when certain features rise or fall in desirability. Housing prices are also affected
by whether the location of housing is near desirable or undesirable metropolitan features.”
(footnote omitted)).
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state, and the prospective homeowner must estimate how valuable
the improved air will be to her in the future.
Study after psychological study has shown that both of these
exercises are fraught with error. Humans are notoriously bad at
206
affective forecasting. And they have surprising difficulty even
remembering how they felt about an event or condition long after it
207
has passed. Although people usually do a good job of anticipating
the valence of life events—that is, whether they will be good or bad—
they tend to make systematic errors about both the magnitude and
208
duration of their affective responses to those events. If individuals
make significant errors when valuing some amenity, then CBA will
similarly make significant errors when it adopts and incorporates
those valuations.
WBA, by contrast, will only require asking people about their
current well-being. The governmental agency can then compare the
current well-being of a population that is receiving the benefits of a
similar regulation with the well-being of that population (or a similar
reference population) before the regulation was implemented to
determine its impact. These findings can then be applied to similar
situations in other locations. No prospective or retrospective
judgments are necessary.
Revealed preference studies in conjunction with wages and
workplace conditions have precisely the same problem. Imagine a job
that comes with some undesirable working condition, such as an
increased risk of contracting emphysema due to airborne chemicals in
the workplace. A typical wage study would compare the salary
accompanying this job to the salary accompanying a comparable job
209
that lacked the risk of emphysema.

206. See Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 49, at 131 (“Research on affective forecasting has
shown that people routinely mispredict how much pleasure or displeasure future events will
bring and, as a result, sometimes work to bring about events that do not maximize their
happiness.” (emphasis omitted)); see also David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living
in California Make People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9
PSYCHOL. SCI. 340, 344–45 (1998) (discussing affective forecasting errors).
207. See Dylan M. Smith, Ryan L. Sherriff, Laura Damschroder, George Loewenstein, &
Peter A. Ubel, Misremembering Colostomies? Former Patients Give Lower Utility Ratings Than
Do Current Patients, 25 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 688, 691 (2006) (describing difficulties with
remembering affective states).
208. For Wilson and Gilbert’s description of this phenomenon, see supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of
Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 1024 (2004) (“WTP/WTA for the risk of death can
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This approach, like the housing study described above, relies on
the predictions of employees regarding conditions with which they
have no experience. The hypothetical employee, asked to choose
between the safer and riskier workplaces, would have to anticipate
what it would be like for her to contract emphysema and then put a
price on the risk of that occurring. This is a significant cognitive
hurdle. This employee presumably does not already have
emphysema, and she may not even know anyone who has ever
contracted emphysema. How, then, could she possibly forecast what it
will be like? The result is that agencies often exclude such risks from
210
cost-benefit analyses, treating them as if they did not exist. Studies
used to determine the value of a statistical life fare little better; how
can an individual reliably estimate the value of her own life or what it
211
would be like to lose it?
WBA simply avoids all of these difficulties. Under WBA,
researchers would ask people with and without emphysema to report
212
on their current levels of well-being. No prospective forecasts or
retrospective judgments are necessary; the individual need only
report her current feelings. Researchers would then compare the
well-being of people with emphysema to people without it. The
differential is the hedonic cost of emphysema, which could then be
plugged directly into a well-being analysis. Because they eliminate
any possibility of affective forecasting (or memory) errors, these
contemporaneous self-assessments are likely to be far more accurate
than the guesses about the future and past that revealed preference
studies demand. At a practical level, well-being analysis thus offers
significant advantages over revealed preference studies.
be inferred from the wage differential between more and less dangerous occupations.”); Cass R.
Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2268–75 (2002) (explaining how the
EPA developed its arsenic regulations under the Clinton administration). But cf. OFFICE OF
INFO. & REGULATORY AFF., supra note 26 at 18 n.20 (noting that OSHA developed its rule on
occupational exposure to hexavalent chromium using a $7 million value of life).
210. See Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,100, 10,307
(Feb. 28, 2006) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918 & 1926 (2012)) (ignoring these
risks); Masur & Posner, supra note 15, at 671 (describing a regulation in which the agency
ignores certain health costs for lack of data).
211. We explain other problems with value-of-life calculations in Part IV.
212. See, e.g., Powdthavee & van den Berg, supra note 162, at 1034 (providing selfassessment data related to a variety of ailments). The preferred method for collecting this data
is to ask the same people for assessments of their own well-being before and after those people
contract emphysema. Large-scale data collection efforts like the British Household Panel
Survey make this approach feasible, and Powdthavee and van den Berg rely on those types of
sources. See id.
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B. Contingent Valuations
Revealed preference studies are widely considered the best
213
methodology for pricing costs and benefits. However, economists
cannot rely entirely on revealed preference studies because not all
costs and benefits involve goods that are traded in markets. Absent a
market that can be used to set the price for a good, cost-benefit
analysis must turn to contingent valuation studies: survey-based
hypothetical questions regarding hypothetical payments for
214
hypothetical projects. For example, imagine that the government is
considering mandating the installation of improved automobile
exhaust systems. The primary effect of these systems would be to
reduce the amount of smog emitted by cars, leading to less smog (and
clearer skies) across the country.
The economic costs of the exhaust systems might be easy to
measure, but how can an agency determine the value of cleaner skies?
Individuals do not have opportunities to buy and sell units of clean
sky for amounts of money. Indeed, government regulation exists in
part because these sorts of transactions are sufficiently difficult that
215
they do not occur. An agency might attempt to use a sophisticated
housing-price study, as described in the previous Section, but those
types of studies are extremely difficult to implement and have never
216
found widespread use in CBA. With no markets to scrutinize, and
with no opportunity to determine WTP by examining revealed
preferences, agencies are forced instead to employ contingent
valuation surveys. These surveys simply ask people how much they
would be willing to pay to receive a benefit (such as cleaner skies) or
to avoid a harm, with little additional guidance.

213. See supra note 187.
214. Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2311, 2315 (2002) (“The valuation
is ‘contingent’ because the valuation produced is contingent upon the hypothetical market that
was contrived. A famous example is the large-scale survey taken in the wake of the Exxon
Valdez oil spill, which sought to elicit the monetary value citizens around the country placed on
avoiding another comparable spill.”).
215. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis
When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1117 (2000) (“Textbook CBA, as
generally understood, directs agencies to translate people’s moral attitudes about the
environment into CVs for the existence of environmental goods that they do not directly enjoy,
usually called ‘existence value’ or ‘nonuse value.’”).
216. See Malani, supra note 199, at 1275 (discussing housing prices as a means of measuring
“the welfare effect of a law,” but noting that “[t]his is, of course, not the standard practice”);
supra Part III.A.2.
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To their credit, contingent valuation surveys avoid many of the
informational and computational problems that plague revealed
preference studies. Respondents need not know the risk presented
because it is stated in the contingent valuation survey. There is no
obvious possibility that they will respond to the risk other than by
demanding more money, because the surveys do not allow for such
217
actions. And by asking directly how much a respondent would pay
to avoid a risk or obtain a benefit, contingent valuation surveys
eliminate the need for difficult regression analysis.
Yet despite these advantages, contingent valuation surveys are
218
nonetheless riddled with serious, perhaps decisive, flaws. The
Subsections that follow describe in detail those problems, and the
corresponding advantages of WBA’s methodologies.
1. Hypothetical Questions. Not surprisingly, the problems with
contingent valuation surveys center on the fact that they necessarily
involve hypothetical questions. Subjects are asked to speculate about
how much they would be willing to pay without having actually to pay
219
anything, which renders their speculation less trustworthy. Subjects
are rarely subject to any true budget constraint: they can state freely
that they would be willing to pay $1 million for cleaner skies without
worrying about the other projects that would go unfunded as a result
220
of such expenditures. And if a researcher wishes to impose a budget
constraint, it is difficult to choose one that is not arbitrary. Subjects
are frequently asked about topics they may know little or nothing
about—for instance, how much they would pay to avoid persistent
221
construction noise that they have never before experienced. This
implicates all of the insurmountable problems related to affective
217. See supra Part III.A.1.
218. See John M. Heyde, Comment, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble?, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 331, 343 (1995) (summarizing criticisms of contingent valuation); see also Ackerman &
Heinzerling, supra note 180, at 1558 (same).
219. See Cross, supra note 187, at 317 (“Because people have little experience placing
monetary value on unpriced natural resources, survey results may be hypothetical and
inaccurate.”).
220. See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Clifford Winston, The Consumer Welfare Effects of Liability
for Pain and Suffering: An Exploratory Analysis, 193 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY:
MICROECONOMICS, no. 1, at 142, 143 n.17 (stating that contingent valuation surveys rarely
involve budget constraints); Cross, supra note 187, at 317.
221. See Cross, supra note 187, at 316; McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, supra note 11, at 66
(“Another frequent criticism of contingent valuation techniques is that they allow value to be
measured by the uninformed opinions of uneducated individuals who have had no experience in
valuing the things that are the subject matter of the surveys.”).
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forecasting that we described in the preceding Section. When real
money and real experiences are not at stake, individual statements
about willingness to pay are simply unreliable. Economists have long
223
understood this point. But CBA cannot avoid such hypothetical
surveys because market transactions do not exist for all potential
costs and benefits.
These weaknesses in contingent valuation surveys have
predictably resulted in prices that are all over the map. To take just
one example: contingent valuation surveys have set the value of a
224
statistical life anywhere from $40,000 to $13 million.
Other tests of the validity of contingent valuation surveys have
produced results that similarly fail to inspire confidence. For instance,
willingness to pay should be proportional to the size of the benefit
conferred or the risk reduced. That is, if people are willing to pay
$1000 to eliminate a 1-in-1000 mortality risk, they should be willing to
225
pay $5,000 to eliminate a 5-in-1000 risk. Yet numerous studies have
shown that this is not the case; individual willingness to pay does not
226
scale proportionately with the size of the risk reduction. For
instance, in one study respondents were only willing to pay 1.6 times
as much to reduce a 5-in-1000 risk as they were to reduce a 1-in-1000
227
risk. Many contingent valuation studies do not even include this
type of validity test. In one recent meta-analysis of 40 contingent
valuation studies, only 50 percent of them incorporated a test for
228
validity. Of those that did include such a test, only 15 percent of the
studies “passed” the test, in the sense that WTP was “nearly

222. See supra Part III.A.1.
223. See Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number
Better Than No Number?, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1994, at 45, 49 (discussing the recurrent
problems with contingent valuation surveys and providing an overview of alternative
explanations for the responses given in willingness-to-pay questions).
224. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 195, at 82–83. The EPA also compiled 40
contingent valuation surveys of the value of life. The standard deviation of the value of life
among those 40 surveys was over $3 million, as calculated by the authors. See id.
225. See Cropper et al., supra note 192, at 327.
226. See id. (surveying the literature).
227. Anna Alberini, Maureen Cropper, Alan Krupnick & Nathalie B. Simon, Does the
Value of a Statistical Life Vary with Age and Health Status? Evidence from the US and Canada,
48 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 769, 782 tbl.6 (2004).
228. Cropper et al., supra note 192, at 327–28 (citing U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra
note 195).
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229

proportional to the risk reduction.” It is hard to put much faith in
policy made on the basis of studies such as these.
One of the principal strengths of WBA is that it need not rely
upon such hypothetical inquiries. Instead, WBA compares
individuals’ contemporaneous levels of happiness before and after an
actual project is completed and then uses that information to make
projections regarding future projects. The surveyed individuals need
not speculate as to how much money they would pay, and they are
not subject to all of the biases and distortions that asking hypothetical
questions regarding money might generate. Rather, they are simply
asked to state their current level of well-being—a question that has
230
been demonstrated to produce reliable and valid answers. For
instance, to estimate the value of clean skies, an agency would collect
data on well-being in a location with clean skies and a location with
smog-filled skies—or, better yet, in the same location before and after
it initiates some project that will lead to cleaner skies. By comparing
well-being figures with and without clean skies, economists could
measure the welfare benefits of reducing smog. These benefits could
then be compared with the economic costs.
Of course, in some cases it may be difficult to isolate the hedonic
effects of clean skies amidst all of the other confounding variables.
For instance, the same jurisdiction that has cleaner skies might also
have lower unemployment rates, which could itself generate greater
well-being. Agencies will need to employ sophisticated multivariate
231
regression analysis, as we describe above in Part II. Yet even when
regression analysis is necessary, at most it will present practical
hurdles that can be surmounted with adequate data and analysis.
However, complicated regression analysis will not always be
necessary. Agencies will often be able to employ intrapersonal data—
essentially, longitudinal studies—to circumvent many of the problems
with multivariate regression we described in the previous Section. For
instance, suppose that an agency wished to evaluate the benefits of a
project that would reduce commute times by upgrading public-transit
systems. Rather than relying on erratic contingent valuation
surveys—or trying to isolate how much people are willing to pay for

229. Id. at 328.
230. DIENER ET AL., supra note 73, at 71–73.
231. See supra Part II; see also Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 80, at S232 (providing an
example of sophisticated multivariate regression being used to isolate the effect of one factor on
happiness).
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shorter commutes by examining housing prices or wages—WBA
would simply determine the well-being of individuals as they are in
the process of commuting. It would then compare that number to
those individuals’ well-being when they are engaged in some leisure
activity—whatever they might have more time for if their commutes
were shortened. The difference between those two figures,
aggregated over the total reduction in commuting times, is the welfare
gain from such a project. The results that WBA will generate are
likely to be more reliable than those that contingent valuation surveys
232
(or revealed preference studies) are currently producing.
2. Wealth Effects. Because they involve asking individuals how
much they would pay for a benefit (or to avoid a cost), contingent
valuation surveys will suffer from all of the same wealth effects that
plague revealed preference studies, described in Part III.A.2.
Respondents will necessarily filter their responses through the lens of
their own finances: a wealthy person might think nothing of paying
$10,000 for cleaner skies, whereas a poorer individual would be highly
unlikely to suggest such a price. Of course, these prices are decoupled
to some degree from individual wealth because contingent valuation
surveys do not actually require respondents to pay anything. But this
is a disadvantage, not an advantage. Instead of values that are
distorted somewhat by wealth, contingent valuation surveys produce
233
values that are distorted significantly by their hypothetical nature.
There are undoubtedly advantages to using average WTP values,
but even that approach has significant limitations. First, the
population of people affected by some potential government action
may not be “average.” For instance, imagine a project that would
produce cleaner skies over Los Angeles. CBA would run into
significant problems if it attempted to gauge the value of this project
by surveying all Californians regarding their willingness to pay for
improved air quality. Many of the surveyed individuals would live in
areas that already have clean air, and would thus value a project to
improve air quality less than a typical Angeleno. Consequently, a

232. As a matter of last recourse, WBA could also ask individuals to predict their well-being
if they were to receive some benefit or suffer some harm. This would be the contingent
valuation version of WBA, and as such it would be subject to all of the problems with affective
forecasting and hypothetical questions we describe here. But at least it would circumvent issues
related to wealth and the translation of welfare into dollars, see infra Part III.B.2, and thus even
this approach might well be superior to standard contingent valuation studies.
233. See supra Part III.B.1 and III.B.2.
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survey that encompassed all Californians would understate the
benefits of cleaner skies in Los Angeles in particular.
Second, average WTP values provide no information as to where
a potential project should be sited when there are multiple
possibilities that might affect different populations of people. More
generally, they are not useful in deciding between similar projects
that affect different populations. The only workable approach in such
a situation is to evaluate the actual effect of the project on the
different groups, a task that cannot be accomplished using average
WTP values.
As we described in Part III.A.2, WBA avoids the problems
caused by wealth effects because it does not require translating costs
and benefits into dollars. By relying directly on self-evaluations of
well-being, WBA simply sidesteps the biases and errors that are
introduced when individuals are asked to price nonmonetary goods.
To be certain, WBA requires aggregating interpersonal welfare
states, and there is no guarantee that each individual is reporting her
welfare identically on any given scale. Yet there is no reason to
believe that these self-reports will be systematically biased in any
given direction, and differences should wash out over large sample
234
sizes, as we explained above. The same cannot be said for wealth
effects and CBA.
C. Willingness-To-Pay Measures and WBA: A Summary
What all of this means is that CBA will have great difficulties in
pricing costs and benefits via either revealed preference or contingent
235
This is significant because the pricing of
valuation studies.
nonmonetary goods is essential—even central—to CBA. Nearly every
governmental regulation or project will produce some nonmonetary
benefits and costs, and in many cases the nonmonetary benefits
(reducing risks to life, in particular) form the entire basis for the
regulation. Accordingly, the difficulties inherent in converting costs
and benefits to dollars that we describe here will necessarily limit the
accuracy and usefulness of CBA as a welfarist decision procedure.
WBA, by contrast, has no such problem. Instead of trying to
isolate the amount of money that some individual might demand in
return for accepting a low-probability risk to her life, or might
234. See supra Part II.B.
235. CBA’s less common alternative for valuing life, contingent valuation surveys, is inferior
to WBA on grounds that we discuss in Part III.B.
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hypothetically be willing to pay for some uncertain benefit, WBA
simply adds up the positive experiences of life that individuals stand
to lose or gain under a given project. For instance, to evaluate a
regulation that reduces the risk of death from some workplace-safety
hazard, WBA would aggregate the positive experiences that would be
236
lost if an individual were to die early and then multiply that total by
the odds of early death. After multiplying the resulting number by the
number of people affected by a proposed regulation, regulators would
then compare it with whatever diminution in positivity may be
associated with enacting the regulation (due to increased consumer
costs or some other factor).
To be sure, WBA’s process is imperfect in practice. It relies on
self-reports as proxies for well-being because science has not yet
237
provided a perfect hedonimeter.
Moreover, WBA relies on
estimates of likely outcomes, and it provides only a window into
expected human well-being without resolving how to weigh that
against other potential values. But relying on estimated outcomes is
as much a feature of CBA or anything else as it is of WBA: no one
can predict the future with certainty. Similarly, CBA, like WBA, is
merely a gauge of human welfare that does not resolve or factor in
welfare-unrelated considerations. The only unique disadvantage of
WBA is its reliance on self-reports as proxies, but that imperfection is
outweighed by those of CBA, which uses proxies such as the wage
238
premium that are far more removed from actual well-being.
D. Wealth and Welfare
Before we proceed, we must pause to consider an entirely
separate line of argument that defenders of CBA might offer. The
argument is that WBA is fundamentally misguided precisely because
it attempts to measure welfare directly, rather than wealth. In so
doing, WBA will naturally capture distributional effects: movements
236. Had the person lived, she would have experienced many moments that were, instead,
extinguished by her death. WBA would aggregate the expected number and average level of
positivity of those moments to determine how much positive life experience her early death
deprived her of.
237. Cf. F.Y. EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION
OF MATHEMATICS TO THE MORAL SCIENCES 98–102 (London, C. Kagan Paul & Co. 1881)
(hypothesizing about a hedonimeter); Colander, supra note 72, at 216–19 (reviewing
psychophysic concepts that “dovetail[] with Edgeworth’s description of the hypothesized
hedonimeter”).
238. Cf. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 27, at 1630–32, 1636 (comparing CBA
and WBA using a hypothetical example).
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of money from wealthier individuals to poorer individuals will
increase welfare and be judged favorably by WBA, whereas CBA
would view them as neutral. In the preceding pages we have treated
this as an advantage of WBA. After all, if the goal is to improve
welfare, it makes sense to measure welfare. But defenders of CBA
might instead cast it as a disadvantage. This argument has several
related strands, which we describe and address in turn.
We begin with the most fundamental and conceptual critique.
Some defenders of CBA might argue that it should not be concerned
239
with welfare at all, only with consumption and efficiency. CBA, by
using monetary values, will lead to a maximization of aggregate
wealth and therefore aggregate consumption. If welfare increases
240
linearly with consumption, as many economists believe, then
maximizing consumption will maximize welfare as well. If there are
distributional concerns that implicate welfare, those can be addressed
subsequently through the tax system. Economists generally believe
that it is more efficient to allocate resources via taxes and transfers
241
than through regulations and new policy proposals. Accordingly,
agencies should concentrate on maximizing aggregate wealth and
consumption, and welfare and distributional concerns should be left
to the tax system. If agencies were to switch to a welfarist decision
procedure such as WBA, they would be measuring the wrong
quantity.
Another way of describing this critique of WBA would be to say
that CBA will lead to outcomes that are Kaldor-Hicks efficient, while
242
WBA may not. For instance, in the example we used in Part III.A.2,
the government could locate the waste dump in the poorer area, and
then, using the tax system, transfer $25,000 from each of the rich
individuals to the poorer individuals, leaving each better off than
before the project was begun.
239. We thank David Weisbach for suggesting this point to us. This is contrary to many of
the most sophisticated modern defenders of CBA, who describe it as a welfarist “decision
procedure.” See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 13, at 194.
240. See, e.g., David Weisbach, Toward a New Approach to Disability Law, 2009 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 47, 90 n.90 (stating the common assumption that welfare is quasi-linear in
consumption, or linear with respect to all goods other than medical care).
241. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient
Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) (arguing that the
tax system is more efficient at redistributing wealth than are legal rules such as agency
regulations).
242. See, e.g., BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 123, at 32; E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 390 (1976). For a definition of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see supra note 123.
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We believe that this critique is misguided for a number of
reasons. First of all, even if it is true that welfare does not increase
linearly with consumption, there are very strong reasons to believe
that CBA will not lead to decisions that maximize consumption or are
Kaldor-Hicks optimal. The reason is that the prices CBA must rely
upon are likely to be highly inaccurate, in the sense that they deviate
from what individuals would actually be willing to pay or accept
under conditions of better information.
For instance, imagine that a workplace-safety regulation could
save 10 lives at a cost of $100 million. If the value of a statistical life,
based upon wage-risk studies, is $7 million, then the regulation will
not be cost-benefit justified and the agency will not promulgate it. But
what if that value of a statistical life (VSL) is far too low because of
individuals’ affective forecasting errors? If the true VSL—what
individuals would be willing to pay if they could accurately anticipate
their own future welfare—were much higher, then the agency’s
failure to promulgate the regulation will decrease welfare. This is
entirely apart from whether any compensating transfer takes place.
Conversely, imagine a workplace-safety regulation that will prevent
10 workers from each losing a finger but cost $3 million. If workers
have indicated a willingness to pay $500,000 to avoid losing a
statistical finger, then CBA would favor promulgating this regulation.
But what if that figure is far too high because workers are failing to
anticipate their own adaptation? Workers acting under full
information, including knowledge of their own adaptation, might be
willing to pay only $100,000 to save a statistical finger. If that is the
case, then this regulation will similarly decrease welfare, again
irrespective of whether any compensating transfer takes place.
The entire premise of our argument for WBA is that these types
of individual forecasting and prediction errors are commonplace and
systematic, not merely random or occasional. Over the past decade,
hedonic psychology has provided abundant evidence in support of
this point. If we are correct, then CBA will lead to welfarediminishing results regardless of whether the tax system is properly
distributing wealth. CBA will not even lead to proper determinations
of efficiency when the prices it relies upon are distorted.
In addition, it would be remiss not to note that the Kaldor-Hicks
argument rests upon a tenuous assumption: that the tax system
actually will be used to transfer wealth appropriately. Absent such a
transfer, a project that is Kaldor-Hicks efficient could well lead to a
decrease in welfare, as the example in Part III.A.2 demonstrates. This
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is why even some of CBA’s most sophisticated defenders have
acknowledged that “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency has zero moral
243
relevance.” It is of course difficult to speculate as to whether these
welfare-enhancing compensating transfers will occur in a meaningful
fraction of cases, and little reliable data exists. But there is every
reason to believe that they will be rare, not least of all because they
involve redistributions from politically powerful groups and
individuals (the wealthy) to groups and individuals with much less
244
political power (the poor).
A second, more practical criticism within this line of argument
might be that if agencies can generate aggregate well-being gains by
redistributing wealth, they will spend all of their time redistributing
wealth to the exclusion of other projects and regulations that could
245
lead to greater overall improvements in welfare. For example, the
EPA might spend all of its energy transferring wealth from rich to
poor, rather than regulating hazardous chemicals. But this point
presupposes that wealth redistribution will dominate WBA in ways
that are unconnected to the core purposes of the agencies. As our
sketch of a WBA reveals, this is not the case. The hedonic literature
suggests a relatively tenuous connection between money and welfare
for many Americans, so if anything dominates WBA, it is saving lives
246
by requiring cleaner air or increased safety. Those are the core
missions of many federal agencies, such as the EPA and OSHA. It is

243. Adler & Posner, supra note 109, at S265.
244. See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Introduction to FAIRNESS IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS (Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams eds., forthcoming 2013) (manuscript
at 5) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“Any proposed distributive change, whether
accomplished through legal rules or through tax policy, elicits a certain amount of political
resistance. This resistance may impede movement to a preferred distributive position, or cause
great welfare losses in the process of achieving such movement.”); Edward J. McCaffery,
Bifurcation Blues: The Perils of Leaving Redistribution Aside 2–3 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law
Colloquium on Tax Policy & Pub. Fin., Working Paper No. 2), available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__academics__colloquia__ta
x_policy/documents/documents/ecm_pro_074659.pdf (suggesting that “real-world tax policy is
not up to the burdens that the bifurcation strategy places on it—it is not, that is, situated to
redistribute in any meaningful way”); cf. Share of GDP for Bottom 99th, 95th, and 90th,
VISUALIZING ECON. (Oct. 17, 2006), http://visualizingeconomics.com/blog/2006/10/17/share-ofgdp-99th-95th-90th (showing that the proportion of wealth held by the richest Americans has
risen over the past 35 years and implying that wealth transfers from wealthy to poor have
become less common over time). See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (setting forth an interest-group
theory of politics).
245. We thank Eric Posner for suggesting this point to us.
246. See supra note 71.
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true that WBA could result in forcing manufacturers to spend much
more money to avoid pollution than CBA does, but this is not
because WBA is dominated by the welfare effects of redistributing
money. Instead, it is because WBA is weighing the relative welfare
effects of money and life more accurately than CBA does.
For that matter, agencies do not have open-ended mandates to
act in the public interest; they have authority over specific regulatory
domains and types of activities. Congress and the president could
simply order the EPA to engage in welfare-justified environmental
regulation, or to ignore distributional consequences, and then
separately promulgate a welfare-enhancing tax code if it believed that
to be appropriate. This is, of course, essentially the current
governmental division of labor. There is no reason to believe that
WBA would be an open invitation for agencies to disregard their
regulatory missions. Indeed, even if it were true that redistribution
played a large role in WBA, the upshot would simply be that agencies
should investigate how to enact welfare-justified regulations most
efficiently. WBA could be adjusted to reduce or eliminate the weight
it assigns to redistribution when assessing regulations, and then WBA
could be used again separately to assess distributional consequences
and recommend tax-and-transfer solutions.
Finally, CBA’s defenders might offer an even more limited
variation on the themes of these arguments. Although CBA will
occasionally support projects that diminish welfare, WBA could
equally favor projects that diminish wealth. To take the simplest
possible example, a project that causes a wealthy individual to lose
$1100 and a poor individual to gain $1000 would pass a WBA test
(because it would increase welfare), just as it would fail a CBA test.
Over time, defenders of CBA might say, single-minded use of WBA
would lead to a diminution in national (or worldwide) wealth, with
247
long-term negative consequences. For instance, a welfare-enhancing
but wealth-diminishing project might be so expensive that the
government would later be unable to implement an additional
(superior) welfare-enhancing project, leading to the loss of future
248
welfare gains.

247. We thank Michael Livermore for suggesting this point to us.
248. This amounts to an argument that WBA may be path dependent. Cf. Masur & Posner,
supra note 15 (arguing that CBA is not similarly path dependent, with the exception of projects
and regulations that cause substantial unemployment).
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This argument is correct so far as it goes, though it hardly offers
a reason to prefer CBA to WBA. A methodology that can lead
directly to welfare-diminishing results (CBA) is not uniformly
preferable to one that might conceivably lead indirectly to welfarediminishing results at some point in the indefinite future (WBA).
Nevertheless, it is because of the strength of this argument that we see
potential value in CBA as a complement to WBA. Although we have
argued that WBA could replace CBA in the current role that CBA
plays, it does not necessarily follow that CBA should be left with no
249
role at all.
Agencies should employ both methodologies. A full specification
of how an agency might decide among competing projects when CBA
and WBA disagree, as they often will, is beyond the scope of this
project. But we can offer a brief sketch. It would be a mistake for an
agency to promulgate a regulation that fails a WBA test even if it
250
passes a CBA test, for that regulation will likely decrease welfare.
On the other hand, a regulation that barely passes a WBA test and
drastically fails a CBA test may be undesirable as well. For
regulations that pass WBA but fail CBA, agencies should scrutinize
the ratio of net WBUs gained to net dollars lost. When that ratio is
very low—small welfare gains at the expense of significant decreases
in wealth—the agency generally should not promulgate the regulation
on welfarist grounds, due to the possible indirect harm to welfare of
wasting dollars that could more efficiently increase welfare by being
spent otherwise either now or later. One potential way in which
agencies could determine which ratios are too low might be to
examine these ratios across large numbers of regulations, past and
present, to determine how a given regulation compares with historical
precedent.
Needless to say, when WBA and CBA conflict, we favor placing
greater weight on well-being analysis for the many reasons set forth in
this Article. But we are not unmindful of the valuable role that CBA
could play as a complement to WBA.

249. Of course, as we explained above, even CBA’s ability to measure increases and
decreases in wealth is compromised when the prices it relies upon are distorted. Nonetheless,
the results generated by CBA are almost certainly highly correlated with changes in wealth.
250. There may certainly be non-welfarist grounds for promulgating regulations, but these
are separate from what either CBA or WBA tries to measure.
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IV. WBA AND THE VALUE OF LIVES
When a regulation would save lives, the value of those lives must
be assessed so that the value of saving them can be compared with the
251
costs necessary to do so. In Parts I and III, we discussed the basic
mechanisms by which CBA determines the value of a life. In Part IV,
we now explore the many subtleties that those mechanisms ignore
and the ways in which WBA accounts for those subtleties.
For CBA, every death is typically counted as equivalent to every
other death; and although many within the CBA community have
suggested ways to address this problem, some of their most important
suggestions have rarely been implemented and would constitute only
252
partial solutions anyway. As CBA is currently conducted, a slow,
painful death can be equated with a quick death in one’s sleep. The
deaths caused by a terrorist attack can be equated with those that
occur in skiing accidents. And the death of a 12-year-old is typically
deemed to diminish overall welfare no more than the death of a 90253
year-old. Moreover, CBA often counts all lives equivalently—not
on supportable moral grounds but on insupportable welfarist
grounds—such that a life with a debilitating but nonfatal disease is
said to have as much welfare as a life with perfect health. The
problem with all of these equivalencies is that such differences affect
overall welfare, and CBA’s stated purpose (like that of WBA) is to
measure overall welfare. Because WBA accounts for the actual
effects on welfare of different types of lifesaving regulations, it
measures the benefit side of the ledger more accurately than does
CBA.

251. Some may find it distasteful to place a value on saving a life, but when policy choices
must be made and trade-offs are necessary, there is no alternative. Any decision will involve
such a valuation, so it is a virtue that CBA and WBA make their valuations explicit rather than
hidden.
252. Recent tweaks to CBA have, on occasion, made slight ameliorations to this problem.
But as we discuss in Part IV.B, these improvements are far less effective than is WBA at solving
the problem.
253. Endless arguments could be made on each side about the moral validity of equating the
deaths of the young with those of the old, but CBA cannot avail itself of those arguments. Like
WBA, CBA is simply a tool for measuring aggregate welfare. Its conclusions, like those of
WBA, purport to tell us whether a regulation increases or decreases quality of life on the whole.
Once that verdict is in, policymakers can decide what to do with it, and their decision may well
involve making welfare-independent moral judgments. But when analyzing aggregate welfare
alone, as CBA does, it is indefensible to equate preserving one year of life with preserving 70
years of life. The latter unquestionably increases welfare more than does the former, for
precisely the reason that saving a life at all increases welfare: it grants more time to live.
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To be sure, CBA has means at its disposal of trying to address
these problems, and it actually employs some of them. For example, it
can ask people how much money they would pay to avoid certain
sorts of risk to life rather than other sorts of risk to life. But that
approach has the core limitation shared by everything based on
willingness to pay: it focuses on people’s unreliable predictions of
how certain risks would affect them, rather than on direct
measurements of how those risks do affect them. WBA solves this
problem, as we discuss below.
In Part IV.B, we discuss CBA’s capacity to address the problem
of equating all lives notwithstanding their differences in length and
quality. First, though, we turn to the issue of equating types of death.
A. Not All Types of Death Are Equivalent
1. Different Types of Threats to Life. When policymakers
consider whether a proposed health and safety regulation is worth its
cost, the standard cost-benefit approach is to consider how many lives
254
are actually likely to be saved. This approach, which differentiates
among risks only in the quantitative terms of their likelihood and
255
magnitude, is widely favored by proponents of CBA. Indeed, those
proponents treat this approach as a strength precisely because it
256
elevates true dangerousness over public misperceptions thereof.
Critics of CBA, however, have attacked this approach by
pointing out the degree to which it is at odds with people’s actual
257
views of risk and actual preferences toward regulation.
For
example, a CBA analysis by Robert Hahn in 1996 indicated that the
number of lives likely to be saved by increased airline security was far
258
too low to justify the expense. Of course, this analysis did not
foresee the attacks of September 11, 2001, but the more interesting
issue surrounds what the analysis would have concluded if it had
foreseen those attacks. As Ackerman and Heinzerling note, the

254. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 130.
255. E.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 61–63 (1993); John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress,
in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 183, 193–95 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996); Timur Kuran &
Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 753 (1999);
Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 245 SCIENCE 1232, 1232 (1989).
256. See sources cited supra note 255.
257. See generally ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 123–52.
258. Robert W. Hahn, The Cost of Antiterrorist Rhetoric, 19 REGULATION 51, 54 (1996).
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number of people (about 3000) who died on September 11 is dwarfed
by the number who die from many other causes that are potential
259
subjects of regulation. Hahn’s study itself suggests that “side impact
standards for automobiles and cabin fire protection in aircraft,” which
are “two-hundred times more cost-effective” than proposals for
safeguarding airplanes from terrorism, may well have been favored by
260
CBA under any circumstances. For critics, this demonstrates CBA’s
261
inadequacy.
It seems very likely, however, that most Americans would prefer
to have thwarted the 9/11 attacks even if doing so had required public
expenditures that could have saved lives more efficiently if directed
elsewhere. Such a preference would accord with other findings about
262
the way people perceive risk. Rather than focusing only on the
likelihood and magnitude of harm, they also consider the nature of
263
the risk. “When a hazard is unfamiliar, uncontrollable, involuntary,
inequitable, dangerous to future generations, irreversible, man-made,
264
and/or catastrophic, ordinary people are likely to view it as risky,”
whereas “a hazard that is familiar, controllable, voluntary, equitable,
dangerous only to the present generation, reversible, natural, and/or
diffusely harmful is unlikely to generate much concern in the
265
populace.” These views raise important questions about how to
regulate public health and safety. Many regulatory matters such as
those involving nuclear power and toxic waste would be resolved one
266
way via CBA and a very different way via the views of the public.
What WBA adds to the picture is a way of counting the crucial
fact that people’s feelings about risk—not just the statistical
267
probability of a risk—affect their well-being. Although the fact that
a risk is “dreaded” does not make that risk any likelier, “[p]rolonged
exposure to dreaded risks frequently leads to deep and widespread
268
anxiety, depression, and distrust.” In cataloging these effects, one

259. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 123–24.
260. Hahn, supra note 258, at 54.
261. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 123–24, 136–38.
262. Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk, 236 SCI. 280, 282 (1987).
263. Id.
264. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 130.
265. Id.
266. Slovic, supra note 262, at 285.
267. Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025, 2036–
37 (1999).
268. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 131.
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scholar has noted the anger, confusion, and fear produced by the
269
270
271
risks, as well as their deleterious effects on couples and children.
Another scholar has written at length about the “trauma” imposed by
272
dreaded risks. Yet another scholar focuses on the breakdown of
273
trust that those risks tend to cause.
Anxiety, depression, and distrust can diminish well-being
substantially, and these tangible effects on people clearly must be
counted by any tool that aims to measure well-being. Indeed, even
Hahn’s CBA study that argued against airplane antiterrorism
measures acknowledged the possibility that people might “benefit
274
psychologically” from such measures.
That study further
acknowledged: “It may be that people are willing to pay large sums to
feel safer,” but it concluded that “absent concrete research supporting
275
this assertion, the money would be far better spent” elsewhere.
In contrast to studies like that one, WBA can be used to forecast
the effects of regulation on people’s well-being. By using hedonic
data from communities that have been subjected to the relevant risks,
WBA captures the harms that CBA has been so extensively criticized
for missing. The reason that people’s qualitative judgments of risks
matter is that those judgments themselves influence, sometimes
profoundly, people’s experience of life. Such influence is the thing
that WBA exists to measure.
It is essential to note that WBA does not ignore the actual
likelihood and magnitude of harm on which CBA focuses. Actual
deaths, of course, eliminate well-being and are thus profoundly
weighted in any WBA calculus. This is especially significant because
the harshest critics of CBA, in pushing for a more democratic
approach to risk assessment, can be insufficiently sensitive to
quantitative measures. Hazards that are “familiar,” “equitable,” and

269. MICHAEL EDELSTEIN, CONTAMINATED COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF RESIDENTIAL TOXIC EXPOSURE 44–46 (1988).
270. Id. at 93–95 (noting that, for example, “[s]pouses sometimes held their mates
responsible for getting them into the situation or for their coping strategy,” frequently resulting
in substantial “marital strife”).
271. Id. at 98–105.
272. See generally KAI ERIKSON, A NEW SPECIES OF TROUBLE: EXPLORATIONS IN
DISASTER, TRAUMA, AND COMMUNITY 226–42 (1994).
273. Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 675, 677–80
(1993).
274. Hahn, supra note 258, at 54.
275. Id.
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276

“natural” still ought to be taken very seriously if they are likely to
kill many people. So WBA provides an appropriate mediating
measure between the critics’ focus on psychological triggers of risk
and the lament of CBA practitioners that the public is simply
irrational.
2. Different Types of Death.
CBA also chooses not to
277
differentiate between quick deaths and slow, painful ones, and this
weakness of CBA reveals one of WBA’s strengths. The reason that
people hope to avoid painful deaths is, simply and obviously, that
people dislike pain because it decreases their well-being. If we hold
278
constant the time at which a person will die and contrast two
279
different sets of “circumstances preceding death” —one in which the
person is in pain and miserable, and the other in which the person is
pain-free and relatively happy—several things become clear: (1) the
person is better off in the pain-free scenario, (2) the reason for this is
that she feels better in the pain-free scenario, (3) the amount by
which she is better off is the amount by which she feels better,
multiplied by the amount of time during which she feels better, and
(4) the better a tool of analysis takes account of these facts, the better
it captures the likely effects of a policy on human well-being. WBA is
designed precisely to account for these considerations. CBA ignores
them in practice, and even in theory it could address such concerns
only via proxies that are less reliable and less direct than those of
WBA.
3. How One Person’s Death Affects Another Person’s Welfare.
280
CBA counts death as a cost to the person who died, but not as a
cost to others who may be affected by that person’s death. We
mimicked that practice in our example of WBA earlier in this Article,
but in actual policymaking this is a mistake that should be corrected.

276. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 130.
277. See id. at 70–71 (“[T]he circumstances preceding death are important: sudden, painless
death in pleasant circumstances is different from agonizing, slow deterioration surrounded by
medical technology.”).
278. If the time of death would actually differ, such that a slow death would increase the
length of life, then of course this should be factored in as well. WBA does factor it in, whereas
CBA does not. See infra Part IV.B.
279. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 71.
280. Or, to use CBA’s preferred terminology, it counts the cost of subjecting the members
of a population to an increased risk of death. We believe that this amounts to the same thing.
See supra note 42.
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WBA is well-positioned to do so, because hedonic data already exist
281
about the effect of people’s deaths on those close to them. By
contrast, CBA would have to add this element by asking people how
much money they would be willing to pay to avoid losing a loved one
(or to avoid a risk to that person’s life). Such an approach implicates
all of the problems with CBA we discuss throughout this Article, such
as wealth effects, hypothetical questions, and people’s difficulty in
thinking about infinitesimally small numbers, among others. But the
largest problem, as may always be the case with CBA, is that it
requires people to guess the effect of something on their life in the
future. How much welfare do people lose when their loved ones die?
Instead of relying on what people predict the effect will be, along with
their capacity to convert that effect into dollar figures, it is better to
rely on measures of how such deaths actually affect people’s
happiness, as measured by their in-the-moment self-reports at various
stages of time after the deaths. Hedonic studies measure precisely
282
that.
B. CBA’s Attempted Improvements
When considering whether or not to regulate a risk to human
health, CBA quantifies the value of that risk primarily by determining
the number of lives likely to be saved by regulation and multiplying it
by the statistical value of a human life. The value of a statistical life
(VSL) is computed using the various methods described in Parts I and
III. Accordingly, its reliability suffers from the methodological limits
discussed above. In addition, CBA’s use of statistical lives also has
conceptual faults. When determining an average value for lives saved,
VSL treats the lives saved by regulation indiscriminately. In doing so,
VSL ignores essential data regarding both the length and quality of
the lives protected. Regulations that prolong or improve the quality
of life without “saving” it are not counted by CBA formulas relying
283
on VSL.
Over the past several decades, scholars and policymakers have
developed new tools to overcome VSL’s limitations. This Section
discusses two such tools—“value of statistical life years” (VSLYs) and

281. See, e.g., Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 80.
282. See, e.g., id.
283. As we explain in the next Section, no regulation actually saves lives; it merely prolongs
them. To the extent CBA focuses on saving lives, it is measuring the value of lives that
presumably would have ended more or less immediately without the regulation.
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“quality-adjusted life years” (QALYs). The movement toward
VSLYs and QALYs represents an acknowledgment of the limitations
of traditional CBA methods. The inadequacy of equating all lives
saved with one another is the impetus for moving beyond VSL. But
VSLYs and QALYs are merely way stations on the road from CBA
to WBA. They are efforts to bend CBA to be more sensitive to the
nuances it has been ignoring. But no such tweaks can solve the
problem as comprehensively as can WBA, as the following
Subsections explain.
1. Statistical Lives and Life Years. When standard CBA is
applied to regulations that seek to protect human health and welfare,
policymakers calculate the benefits side of the equation by predicting
284
the number of lives likely to be saved by the proposed regulation.
To compare the number of lives saved to the costs of the regulation
(for example, in higher prices, unemployment, etc.), the value of
those lives must be monetized. Thus, each life saved must be assigned
a specific monetary value. CBA derives this value—known as VSL—
by reference to the various techniques discussed in Parts I and III:
285
revealed preference and contingent valuation studies.
As noted in Part III, the techniques used to derive VSL have
considerable methodological limitations. Perhaps more importantly,
however, the conceptual relationship between VSL and the welfare286
maximizing goals of regulation is deeply strained. By focusing solely
on lives saved, CBA’s use of VSL entirely ignores data that are
relevant to judging the value of regulation. For VSL, the length of the
287
life saved is immaterial. By ignoring longevity, CBA risks creating
highly counterintuitive results. Imagine, for example, that the
government has a finite supply of a vaccine for a deadly disease that
has recently broken out, and it can provide that vaccine either to 100
children or 101 hospice patients. Under CBA, using the VSL
approach, the government should prefer to give the drug to the
hospice patients, because doing so would potentially save one

284. See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 13, at 47 (explaining that reduced mortality risk
is one of the greatest justifications for the EPA’s cost-benefit decisions).
285. Id. at 47–49.
286. We do not here discuss other extra-welfarist goals of regulation.
287. Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness To Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205,
208 (2004); see also James K. Hammitt, Valuing Changes in Mortality Risk: Lives Saved Versus
Life Years Saved, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 228, 229–31 (2007) (discussing differences
between VSL and VSLY measures).
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additional life. We doubt, however, that anyone would suggest that
giving the vaccine to the hospice patients increases overall welfare.
After all, the benefit from the drug will likely only prolong the lives of
the hospice patients for a few weeks, whereas the children might be
expected to live for decades.
In response to these kinds of problems, scholars have suggested
288
that regulators consider instead the number of “life years” at issue.
Rather than relying simply on statistical lives, researchers should
calculate the value of a statistical life year (VSLY), which involves
dividing the VSL by the average life expectancy of the subjects of the
289
290
studies. VSLY has an estimated value of approximately $180,000.
Looking again at the vaccine example from the perspective of VSLY,
the answer is obvious and intuitive: 100 children × 50 life years per
child × $180,000 = $90 million; 101 hospice patients × 0.1 life years per
patient × $180,000 = $1.8 million. By considering the number of life
years saved by regulation, the VSLY method offers a closer proxy for
291
the actual welfare value at stake.
Nonetheless, the VSLY approach has been criticized both for its
lack of empirical support and the potential outcomes that it
292
generates. These concerns are based on the claim that VSLY
inappropriately undervalues the lives of older people. Empirically, in
surveys of WTP to avoid risk, there is mixed evidence about whether
older people actually value risk less than younger people, as VSLY
293
would suggest. Although some studies show that willingness to pay
to avoid risk declines with age, as one might expect, some show no
294
difference and others show the inverse. According to Richard
288. Sunstein, supra note 287, at 206 (“[I]t is sensible to think that government should
consider not simply the number of lives at stake, or the VSL; it should concern itself also or
instead with the number of life-years at stake, or the value of statistical life-years . . . .”).
289. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 13, at 78.
290. See id. (using $180,000 as an example VSLY value).
291. Sunstein, supra note 287, at 208 (“If the goal is to promote people’s welfare by
lengthening their lives, a regulation that saves five hundred life-years (and, let us say, twentyfive people) is, other things being equal, better than a regulation that saves fifty life-years (also,
let us say, twenty-five people).”).
292. We do not here discuss concerns about whether VSLYs enact illegal age discrimination.
For discussion, see id. at 220.
293. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 13, at 81 (“Relevant studies have found that the
willingness to pay does not resemble the constant age-dependent discount postulated by
proponents of the life-years method.”).
294. See Alberini et al., supra note 227, at 771 (finding no significant difference between
older and younger people); V. Kerry Smith, Mary F. Evans, Hyun Kim & Donald H. Taylor, Jr.,
Do the Near-Elderly Value Mortality Risks Differently?, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 423, 423 (2004)
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Revesz and Michael Livermore, the failure to observe a decrease in
WTP should not be surprising in light of the typically higher wealth of
older people and the greater scarcity of the limited years they have
295
remaining.
In situations in which the data appear to diverge from the theory,
however, it is just as possible that the data are misleading as it is that
the theory is incorrect. There are a number of plausible explanations
for the finding that older people are sometimes willing to pay more to
avoid risk than younger people. Many of these explanations do not
undermine the idea that saving more life years saves more welfare.
For example, as Revesz and Livermore note, older people typically
have greater wealth than younger people do, and wealth is strongly
296
correlated with increased WTP. If the greater WTP on the part of
older people is based upon wealth, it should be treated as a
confounding factor rather than evidence of welfare. Additionally,
“older people have less to do with their money” and fewer other
297
options for spending it, as saving is not a strong priority. Further,
when valuing goods and risks in contingent valuation studies, people
often demonstrate significant “scope neglect.” For instance, they are
often willing to pay the same amount to save 1000, 10,000, or 100,000
298
birds from some type of hazard. Plausibly, then, when 40-year-olds
and 70-year-olds are asked to value losing “the rest of your life” they
may treat these different time periods similarly.
Whereas opponents of VSL contend that the use of VSLY exacts
299
a “senior death discount” because it treats the lives of older people
as less valuable than those of younger people, we view this
discrepancy as consistent with our intuitions about the remaining
welfare associated with those lives. Younger people will, on average,
have greater welfare left to enjoy than do older people. As Cass
Sunstein has suggested, people placed behind a “veil of ignorance”
300
would overwhelmingly favor regulations that save more life years.

(finding that older people have higher WTP than younger people); Viscusi & Aldy, supra note
195, at 50 (finding that older people have lower WTP than younger people).
295. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 13, at 80–81.
296. Id.
297. Sunstein, supra note 287, at 233.
298. Desvousges et al., supra note 106, at 113.
299. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 13, at 79 (quotation marks omitted).
300. Sunstein, supra note 287, at 214–15 (“If people do not know how old they are, would
they have the slightest difficulty concluding that it is better to eliminate a 1/50,000 risk faced by
one million teenagers than a 1/50,000 risk faced by one million senior citizens?”).
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To the extent one is trying to maximize welfare, it is better to save 30year-olds than 80-year-olds.
2. Quality-Adjusted Life Years. We consider the VSLY approach
to be a substantial improvement over the VSL technique traditionally
favored by CBA. However, although VSLY directs attention to
welfare-relevant data overlooked by VSL, the life-years approach
itself ignores a meaningful component of the value of risk regulation:
the quality of the years saved. As with the VSL approach, this has the
potential to create counterintuitive results. For example, the life-years
approach would be indifferent between (1) a program that extended
the lives of 100 people for 10 years with those years spent in poor
health, and (2) a program that extended the lives of 100 people for 10
years with those years spent in excellent health. Despite people’s
301
capacity to adapt hedonically to certain types of poor health, there
is almost certainly a greater welfare gain in the second program
because poor health will almost always be associated with meaningful
302
hedonic penalties.
To remedy this shortcoming, some scholars have recommended
adopting quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) in cost-benefit
303
analysis. The QALY was initially developed in the related field of
cost-effectiveness analysis to provide data on the efficient use of
304
scarce resources in medical decisionmaking. Unlike the VSL and
VSLY approaches, QALYs were not initially designed with respect to
305
306
standard welfare theory,
but some commentators —including
307
308
courts and agencies —see value in the use of QALYs in CBA. As

301.
302.
303.
304.

Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 112, at 1527–28.
Id. at 1531.
See Sunstein, supra note 287, at 246.
Milton C. Weinstein, George Torrance & Alistair McGuire, QALYs: The Basics, 12
VALUE HEALTH S5, S5 (2009).
305. Amiram Gafni, Economic Evaluation of Health-Care Programmes: Is CEA Better Than
CBA?, 34 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 407, 408 (2006).
306. Adler, supra note 209, at 1044.
307. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (suggesting that
QALYs may be used by agencies to develop tools for judging harm), rev’d in part sub nom.
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
308. Medical Devices; Patient Examination and Surgeons’ Gloves; Test Procedures and
Acceptance Criteria, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,404, 15,411 (proposed Mar. 31, 2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
pt. 800 (2012)).
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yet, however, QALY analysis faces a number of methodological
309
hurdles before it can be successfully incorporated into CBA.
QALY analysis requires researchers to determine the relative
values of living in different health states. The goal is to arrange
various health states along a quantitative, cardinal dimension in which
310
1.0 is equivalent to perfect health and 0 is death. The qualityadjusted value of a health state is then multiplied by the number of
311
life years spent in that state to determine the QALY. Thus, if a
treatment option will extend a person’s life by 10 years but in less
than full health (say, 0.7), it generates 7 QALYs. Such a treatment
would be preferred over a treatment that extended a person’s life by
12 years at worse health (say, 0.4 = 4.8 QALYs) or one that extended
the person’s life 5 years in full health (5 QALYs).
To generate values for the necessary quality adjustments,
researchers rely on three principle survey techniques. Subjects may be
asked to use rating scales such as the EuroQol, a five-item scale that
asks subjects to simply compare health states that differ on a variety
312
of dimensions such as pain, mobility, and self-care. In time trade-off
studies, subjects are asked to choose between being in a state of poor
health for a set period of time or being in full health for a shorter
313
period. In “standard gamble” studies, subjects choose between ill
health for a period of time or a treatment that has a chance of
314
restoring them to full health and a chance of death. Researchers
then use the subjects’ responses to calculate the relative value of, say,
walking with a cane and being confined to a wheelchair.
The first difficulty with adopting QALY analysis as part of
traditional CBA is determining how to monetize QALYs. When
QALYs are used in cost-effectiveness analysis in healthcare
decisionmaking, no effort is made to quantify the value of a QALY.
Instead, different programs may be compared to one another or a
309. See generally John Broome, Qalys, 50 J. PUB. ECON. 149 (1993).
310. Thomas Klose, A Utility-Theoretic Model for QALYs and Willingness To Pay, 12
HEALTH ECON. 17, 20 (2003). A QALY is “a utility-based, cardinal, interpersonally
comparable, and time-dependent measure of effectiveness based on preferences over health and
time.” Id. at 17.
311. Gafni, supra note 305, at 412.
312. How To Use EQ-5D, EUROQOL GRP., http://www.euroqol.org/about-eq-5d/how-touse-eq-5d.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
313. Cam Donaldson, Stephen Birch & Amiram Gafni, The Distributional Problem in
Economic Evaluation: Income and the Valuation of Costs and Consequences of Health Care
Programmes, 11 HEALTH ECON. 55, 60–61 (2002).
314. Id. at 60.
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program may be compared to an arbitrary threshold. This resistance
to quantifying the value of health and life has likely played a role in
316
making QALYs attractive to healthcare professionals, but it has
317
done so at the cost of providing a clear decision rule. To provide
such a rule, scholars have attempted to calculate a constant WTP-perQALY figure that can be plugged in to CBA. As yet, however, no
318
clear number has been developed. This difficulty may arise for some
of the same reasons that calculating the value of a life year is a
319
problem—framing effects, prospect theory, scarcity, and the like.
More problematic, however, is the method that researchers use
to elicit QALY values. Just as contingent valuation studies suffer
from having people attach monetary values to things like health and
the environment that are difficult to think about and monetize,
QALY studies often require healthy individuals to make value
judgments about health states that they have never experienced. To
be valuable in welfare analysis, QALYs should reflect how people
feel in various states of health. Instead, when healthy people are
asked about states of poor health they will tend to provide answers
320
about how they feel about those health states. A rich empirical
literature that we have discussed in a previous article demonstrates
individuals’ inability to accurately assess the value of health states
321
they have not experienced. Healthy people regularly overestimate
both the magnitude and duration of the hedonic impact of many
negative health states, including cancer, dialysis treatment, paralysis,
322
and colostomy. When asked to think about these negative health
states, healthy people suffer from a number of cognitive and affective
315. See Richard A. Hirth, Michael E. Chernew, Edward Miller, A. Mark Fendrick &
William G. Weissert, Willingness To Pay for a Quality-Adjusted Life Year: In Search of a
Standard, 20 MED. DECISION MAKING 332, 333 (2000).
316. Gafni, supra note 305, at 410.
317. Hirth et al., supra note 315, at 332.
318. Hirth and his coauthors found WTP/QALY figures ranging from $24,000 to $428,000
with an average of $265,000, but they failed to find “a strong central tendency.” Id. at 338–39;
see also Paul Dolan & Richard Edlin, Is It Really Possible To Build a Bridge Between CostBenefit Analysis and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis?, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 827, 838 (2002)
(concluding that reconciling CBA and CEA is impossible and recommending that the debate
focus on determining which approach is more appropriate for a given situation).
319. See Daniel Kahneman, A Different Approach to Health State Valuation, 12 VALUE
HEALTH S16, S16 (2009).
320. See Daniel M. Hausman, Valuing Health, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 246, 256 (2006).
321. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur., supra note 112, at 1526–35.
322. For a review, see Paul Dolan & Daniel Kahneman, Interpretations of Utility and Their
Implications for the Valuation of Health, 118 ECON. J. 215, 221–22 (2008).
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biases that hinder their judgment: they neglect the role of hedonic
adaptation, they focus primarily on the transition from good to poor
health, and their attention is focused on the health domain to the
323
exclusion of other domains. Thus, in time trade-off and standard
gamble studies, healthy people are willing to give up significantly
324
more remaining life than are current patients. This results in biased
QALY scores that overestimate the welfare losses from many health
325
states.
Although asking current or former patients to respond to these
studies might help, it is unlikely to resolve all measurement issues.
Time trade-off and standard gamble studies, like contingent valuation
and revealed preference studies, rely on what Daniel Kahneman has
called decision utility: subjects make judgments about the value of
past or future states of the world. In addition to the prediction
problems listed above, such studies also suffer from cognitive biases
associated with recollection of past states. For example, colonoscopy
patients have been shown to prefer longer, more painful procedures
to shorter, less painful ones when the former ended with a period of
326
diminished but still significant pain. It is also possible that current
and former patients who are adapting or have adapted to their
conditions may neglect the preadaptation period during which their
327
condition was causing substantial welfare losses.
3. Well-Being Units. Our proposal to replace CBA with WBA is
based on the ability of WBA to solve the conceptual and
methodological limitations associated with measuring the value of

323. Id. at 223.
324. See, e.g., David L. Sackett & George W. Torrance, The Utility of Different Health States
as Perceived by the General Public, 31 J. CHRONIC DISEASES 697, 702 (1978) (reporting QALYs
for dialysis treatment of 0.39 and 0.56 for healthy subjects and patients, respectively). Often,
patients are willing to sacrifice no or very little life, resulting in QALY scores at or near 1.0 for a
variety of diseases. See Erik Nord, Norman Daniels & Mark Kamlet, QALYs: Some Challenges,
12 VALUE HEALTH S10, S10–11 (2009) (noting that “unwillingness to trade lifetime in
elicitations of experienced utility” is an issue).
325. It is worth noting that other relatively minor negative health states prove surprisingly
resistant to adaptation, such as ringing in the ears and chronic headaches. To the extent that the
public does not predict the substantial hedonic losses associated with these conditions, QALY
scores will underestimate welfare losses. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 112, at
1541.
326. Donald A. Redelmeier & Daniel Kahneman, Patients’ Memories of Painful Medical
Treatments: Real-Time and Retrospective Evaluations of Two Minimally Invasive Procedures,
116 PAIN 3, 7 (1996).
327. Dolan & Kahneman, supra note 322, at 225.
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life. WBA incorporates the valuable corrections offered by VSLYs
and QALYs while avoiding their shortcomings. As noted in Part
IV.B.1, CBA’s preferred tool, VSL, provides a weak proxy for
general intuitions about welfare because it neglects data about both
the longevity and the quality of life. The VSLY and QALY
approaches go some distance toward solving this issue, but they run
into problems of their own.
The well-being units that we propose can be thought of as
QALYs derived from experienced utility rather than decision utility.
By using elicitation techniques that more or less directly measure
subjective well-being, WBA can generate a more accurate measure of
both the quantity and quality of the value of life. Ecologicalmomentary assessment, day-reconstruction method, and quality-oflife surveys provide data on the lived experiences of people in a wide
328
variety of states. Accordingly, they can measure the value of a
broader spectrum of experiences, including not just health risk but
also the impact on well-being of social, professional, and
environmental factors. WBA is also more attuned to the importance
of emotional well-being, including positive emotions, which are
329
almost entirely ignored by CBA.
In addition to proving a more nuanced and accurate picture of
the quality of life, the techniques used by WBA avoid a number of
the methodological problems faced by various versions of CBA. The
cognitive biases that hinder contingent valuation, revealed
preferences, and QALY studies are substantially muted in WBA.
Respondents are only asked to answer simple questions rating their
current level of happiness. Such questions do not require them to
value nonmarket goods, make complex health trade-offs, or predict
or remember different experiences. As such, they are less susceptible
to wealth effects, demand effects, framing effects, and affective
330
forecasting errors. Unlike traditional CBA and QALY analysis,
which require people to make incredibly difficult judgments about the
monetary or health value of things they have never experienced,

328. See supra Part II.B.
329. The converse is similarly true. Matthew Adler notes that CBA analyses “almost never
enumerate and price the distressing mental states, such as fear, anxiety, worry, panic, or dread,
that are causally connected to environmental, occupational, and consumer hazards and would
(or at least might) be reduced by more stringent regulation.” Adler, supra note 209, at 997.
330. For a description of the distortions to CBA caused by these biases and errors, see supra
Part III.
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WBA directly tracks people’s experiences and the emotions that
those experiences create.
Finally, because WBA does not attempt to translate experiences
into money, it avoids difficult problems associated with monetizing
QALYs. In WBA, the costs and benefits of proposed policies are
hedonized, and their impact on people’s well-being is weighed. To the
extent that a policy increases or decreases wealth, the effects of the
331
changes in wealth on welfare will be measured directly. Moreover,
the value of a year at a certain level of well-being is less likely to be
altered by the effects of age or wealth than are VSLs, VSLYs, and
QALYs.
V. DISCOUNTING IN CBA AND WBA
One of the most intractable problems within CBA involves the
332
choice of a discount rate. CBA is based upon monetary values, and
333
the value of money is not constant across time. A dollar is not worth
the same amount in 2011 as it was in 2001, much less 1911. It is better
to have one dollar today than one dollar one year from today. In
addition, governmental projects and regulations do not always
334
produce benefits in the same years that they generate costs. For
instance, a regulation that banned emphysema-causing chemicals in
the workplace might create immediate costs—firms that used those
chemicals would have to eliminate them immediately and find safer
(and presumably more expensive) alternatives. But the benefits
would arrive only several years later, because emphysema is a slow335
onset disease that typically takes years to develop. CBA would thus
measure the costs of such a regulation in 2011 dollars, and the
benefits in (for instance) 2021 dollars, which are less valuable. To
make a true apples-to-apples comparison, the agency would then be

331. See, e.g., Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 106, at 1071 (discussing the possibility of
estimating monetary compensating variations for changes in well-being).
332. See Adler & Posner, supra note 215, at 1142 (showing that agency freedom to choose a
different discount rate for every regulation has led to large disparities in measuring benefits).
333. Lisa Heinzerling, Risking It All, 57 ALA. L. REV. 103, 107–08 (2005) (explaining the
concept of a discount rate).
334. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk,
Money, and Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171, 180 (2007) (using the regulation of
arsenic as an example of a government program that would impose present costs but provide
benefits in the form of reduced cancer rates decades in the future).
335. See Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO.
(May 1, 2011), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001153.
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forced to discount the 2021 benefits to present value—effectively
determining what those 2021 benefits are worth in 2011 terms.
The mathematics behind such discounting are easy. What is
difficult is determining the proper discount rate to use. That is, how
much less is a benefit in 2012 worth than a benefit in 2011? Ten
percent less? Seven percent? Five or three percent? The answer can
have a significant impact upon regulatory decisions. For instance,
consider the question of how aggressively the United States should
regulate to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. In 2009, the Obama
administration convened a multiagency working group to determine
how much harm was being done to the world economy by global
336
warming on account of greenhouse-gas emissions. The working
group calculated the cost to the world for each ton of carbon dioxide
337
emitted, in U.S. dollars. Many of the harms from global warming
will only occur 50 or even 100 years from now, and so it was necessary
to discount those harms to present-day dollars. However, as is often
the case, the agency could not settle on a single discount rate. Instead,
it reported the cost of carbon emissions at three different discount
rates: 2.5 percent, 3 percent, and 5 percent. The results are reported
in Table 4, below.
Table 4: Worldwide Cost of Emitting One Ton of Carbon Dioxide at
338
Various Discount Rates (in 2011 dollars)
Discount rate:
Cost:

5%
$4.90

3%
$21.90

2.5%
$35.70

As is evident from the table, the choice of discount rate has a
tremendous effect on the estimate of harm. Halving the discount rate,
from 5 percent to 2.5 percent, more than septuples the cost of each ton
of carbon dioxide. This is because a cost or benefit that occurs in the
distant future must be discounted heavily when translating it into
2011 dollars—the value of the cost decreases 5 percent (or 2.5
percent) per year. Over several decades, small differences in the
discount rate compound into substantial divergences in overall costs.
Accordingly, it is no exaggeration to say that the choice between a 2.5
percent discount rate and a 5 percent discount rate could determine
336. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of CostBenefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1561.
337. Id. at 1577–79.
338. Id. at 1580 (listing values for 2011).
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whether the United States regulates greenhouse-gas emissions fairly
339
stringently, or not at all.
Why is it difficult for agencies and other decisionmakers to select
a discount rate? The reason is that there is no agreement about
precisely why discounting is necessary; and even when there is
agreement on the reasons for discounting, there is no agreement on
what discount rate would be proper given the rationale behind
discounting.
The predominant reason that future costs and benefits must be
discounted is the “time value of money”—the fact that one dollar is
not worth the same amount at every point in time. This is partly
because of inflation: one dollar buys fewer goods and services in 2011
340
than it bought in 1911. It is also because money can earn interest if
it is saved, rather than spent. For instance, imagine a regulation that
would require an expenditure of $10,000 in 2011 and yield $15,000 of
benefits in 2021. Is this regulation worth enacting? One approach is to
consider how much $15,000 is worth in 2021, compared with $10,000
in 2011. This would involve calculating the rate of inflation and
determining which sum of money has more purchasing power in the
given year. If this approach is correct, then the discount rate should
be the long-term rate of inflation, which is approximately 2.4
341
percent. Another approach is to ask how much the original $10,000
would be worth in 2021 if it were invested, instead of being spent on
342
complying with the regulation. If this approach is correct, then the
discount rate should be the typical long-term rate of return on an
343
investment of that size. There is a great deal of disagreement

339. See id. at 1598–99 (arriving at the same conclusion); David Weisbach & Cass R.
Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting the Future: A Guide for the Perplexed, 27 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 433, 440 (2009) (“[B]ecause of the potentially profound effect of discount rates,
these figures are central to major disagreements over climate change policy.”).
340. See Overview of BLS Statistics on Inflation and Prices, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/bls/inflation.htm (last updated Mar. 1, 2012).
341. See BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CPI DETAILED REPORT: DATA
FOR DECEMBER 2012, at 78 tbl.24 (2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid1212.pdf. The
average inflation rate between 2002 and 2012 was calculated by the authors based upon the data
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
342. See, e.g., Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 339, at 435–36.
343. See generally Paul A. Samuelson, An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest With
or Without the Social Contrivance of Money, 66 J. POL. ECON. 467 (1958).
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regarding what that rate of return is, but most estimates place it at 7
344
percent.
Thus, even when the discount rate is based purely on the time
value of money, different approaches to calculating that value can
produce widely divergent results. Many administrative agencies avoid
this issue by refusing to decide between these approaches and
calculating cost-benefit analyses with both of them. For instance, the
Office of Management and Budget recommends that agencies use a 7
percent discount rate but perform cost-benefit analyses with both 3
345
percent and 7 percent discount rates. Most agencies follow this
346
advice, including OSHA and the EPA. Yet the choice among those
discount rates is often determinative of whether a regulation
347
produces more benefits than costs. Consider the emphysema
example from the previous paragraphs. At a 3 percent discount rate,
the regulation would provide approximately $11,160 in benefits,
348
discounted to their 2011 value. But at a 7 percent discount rate, the
regulation provides only $7,600 in benefits—far below the $10,000 in
349
costs.
CBA has no way to avoid these difficulties. But WBA does.
Unlike money, well-being is time invariant. Five WBUs in 2021 are
worth just as much in welfare terms as 5 WBUs in 2011. Indeed, the
entire reason that the value of money varies over time is that the
amount of well-being it can be used to purchase varies over time.
Thus, there is no need to discount in order to accommodate the timevalue of well-being. Many of the difficulties with discounting that
force EPA to report results at two different discount rates, and the
344. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A94, GUIDELINES AND DISCOUNT RATES FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL
PROGRAMS 9 (1992), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a094 (“Constantdollar benefit-cost analyses of proposed investments and regulations should report net present
value and other outcomes determined using a real discount rate of 7 percent. This rate
approximates the marginal pretax rate of return on an average investment in the private sector
in recent years.”).
345. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4,
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 33–34 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
circulars_a004_a-4.
346. See, e.g., Masur & Posner, supra note 15, at 672 (describing OSHA’s use of both 7
percent and 3 percent discount rates in a CBA of hexavalent chromium exposure standards).
347. See, e.g., id. at 673 (reporting the divergent results for a CBA of an OSHA regulation
conducted at 3 percent and 7 percent discount rates); Masur & Posner, supra note 138, at 629
tbl.5 (reporting the same for an EPA regulation).
10
348. The calculation is $15,000 / (1.03) = $11,161.41.
10
349. Similarly, the calculation is $15,000 / (1.07) = $7,625.24.
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interagency climate change working group to do so at three different
rates, are simply irrelevant to WBA.
That is not to say that WBA will necessarily be able to avoid
discounting entirely. We noted above that there is no agreement on
precisely why (or whether) discounting should occur. In the preceding
paragraphs, we described a leading theory: inflation and the
possibility of investment interest alter the value of money over time.
However, there are other candidate theories that are not so easily
dealt with by WBA. For instance, it might be that individuals simply
have pure time preferences for immediate gratification over later
350
benefits. Someone might prefer having 6 WBUs today and 5 WBUs
tomorrow to the reverse. This could be driven by the fear that the
individual will die before she is able to enjoy the more distant
351
rewards, or it could simply be human impatience. Alternatively,
there might be some separate moral reason to privilege present
welfare over future welfare (for example, a duty to one’s own
generation), or conceivably the reverse (a duty to future
352
generations).
We take no position on whether discounting is appropriate for
any of these reasons, though we note that the case for doing so has
353
not been conclusively established. If discounting is appropriate,
then well-being analysis will have to include discounting as well. But
for CBA, this discounting would be above and beyond any
discounting that might be necessary due to inflation and interest
rates. CBA would have two sets of problems to sort through. WBA
simplifies the issue at least by half. And when it comes to such a
thorny and yet potentially decisive issue as what discount rate to
select, that constitutes progress.

350. See Revesz, supra note 11, at 997–1002 (describing the argument for pure time
preferences); see also IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST: AS DETERMINED BY
IMPATIENCE TO SPEND INCOME AND OPPORTUNITY TO INVEST IT 25–32 (1930) (same).
351. Revesz, supra note11, at 997–1002.
352. See Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 339, at 445.
353. See Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in JUSTICE
BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 144, 155 (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds.,
1992) (arguing that pure time preferences are irrational). We note as well that there is a
significant literature regarding whether a zero discount rate (which is equivalent to a decision
not to discount) would produce one or more paradoxes. See, e.g., Sunstein & Rowell, supra note
334, at 175–77 (2007); W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Discounting for Regulatory Analysis, 74 U. CHI.
L. REV. 209, 216–17 (2007). Further research will be necessary to determine whether these
paradoxes would apply with the same force—or with any force—to WBA employing WBUs.
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CONCLUSION
For decades, cost-benefit analysis has been the primary tool by
which policymakers analyze prospective laws and administrative
regulations. Hundreds of millions of lives have been affected
profoundly by the answers that CBA generates. All along, critics from
within and without have pointed to the fact that CBA relies primarily
on mechanisms—such as contingent valuation surveys (how much
would you pay to save 20,000 birds?) and wage premiums (how much
more do dangerous jobs pay than safe ones?)—that have been
demonstrated to yield unreliable and invalid data. But CBA persists
because no compelling rival account has emerged to replace it.
We offer well-being analysis as an alternative. WBA aims to
measure how people actually experience their lives: what makes them
happy and unhappy, and what they enjoy and dislike. Instead of
introducing the distortions created by using money as a proxy for
people’s quality of life, WBA analyzes that quality directly.
Psychological studies of hedonic well-being have yielded data that
pass the same canonical tests of social science that CBA’s studies fail.
Those hedonic studies, which form the backbone of WBA, provide
the same capability for numerical comparison of policy choices as
does CBA. The difference is that WBA’s answers avoid many of the
pitfalls that plague CBA.
Although WBA is not meant to answer the ultimate question of
354
what policies should be chosen, we think it improves upon CBA in
playing a key role in the decisionmaking process: the role of assessing
policies’ effects on the quality of human life. That need not be the
355
only consideration in making policy, but it is at minimum an
important one.
Scholars, regulators, and even heads of state have known for
years of CBA’s weaknesses. But they have felt compelled nonetheless
to accept CBA on the ground that an attempt at rigorous comparison
is preferable to the absence of any comparison at all. WBA offers a
viable alternative or complement. The question is not whether WBA
is perfect—no tool of social policy is—but rather whether it
constitutes an improvement upon the status quo. The answer may
well be yes.

354. Adler & Posner, supra note 13, at 52–61. We adopt the same “weak welfarist” position
that Adler and Posner favor, using WBA in addition to or in place of CBA to measure welfare.
355. Id.

